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In this work I present an analysis of the level and
effectiveness of public participation in the EIS process in
Puerto Rico and the effectiveness of said participation as it
bears on the "environmental soundness" of the decision. The
work is aimed at helping policy-makers, planners, and
communities to frame planning as a political, interactive,
social process that requires citizen involvement in order to
be successful.
The fundamental premise of my research is that public
participation in the formal EIS process in Puerto Rico, and in
planning in general, does not lead, necessarily, to public
influence over public policy decisions. Instead it is the
public's willingness and ability to go outside the formal EIS
process that allows for a modicum of environmental protection.
But, while the general public's ability to influence
government decisions impacting the environment is limited,
pro-development groups are able to influence government
decisions with a minimum of active participation in the formal
EIS process.
The research is based on two case-studies. The first case
is of the EIS process for the Ballena Development
Corporation-Club Med proposal for a tourist development in
GuAnica. The second case is the study of the government's
attempt to amend the existing EIS Regulations and an analysis
of the substance of the proposed amendments. I pay particular
attention to the level and effectiveness of public
participation in the Bahia Ballena EIS process, and to the
institutional barriers / support-mechanisms that affected such
participation. I also examine the public's use of tools and
mechanisms outside the institutional process and the
effectiveness of this strategy in influencing the final
decision. In the case of the amendments I pay attention to
inter-agency dynamics, to the proposed amendments' possible
impact on the balance of power between the state and private
development interest, and the potential impacts of the
amendments on the public's ability to participate effectively
in the process.
In the thesis I present an alternative, citizen-centered
approach to EIS that corresponds to the planning-mechanism and
information dissemination objectives of EIS legislation. I
also present, for discussion purposes, an outline of a new
government organization that would be responsible for carrying
out the citizen-centered approach to EIS.
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INTRODUCTION
It is well established in the planning literature that
public participation in planning processes in general, and in
environmental planning in particular, is necessary in
effectively defining the problems affecting a community and
formulating pragmatic responses to them. Like many other
environmental laws (at the federal and state levels in the
United States, as well as in other democratic nations), Puerto
Rico's Environmental Public Policy Act of 1970 (popularly
known in Puerto Rico and henceforth referred to as Ley 9)
requires citizen participation. The process of Environmental
Impact Statements (EIS) established by the Ley 9, seeks public
participation in an attempt to secure environmentally-sound
decisions. In this work I present an analysis of the level and
effectiveness of public participation in the EIS process in
Puerto Rico and the effectiveness of said participation as it
bears on the "environmental soundness" of the decision.
THE THESIS
The fundamental premise of my research is that public
participation in the formal EIS process in Puerto Rico does
not lead, necessarily, to public influence over the decision
that is made. Instead it is the public's willingness and
ability to go outside the formal EIS process that allows for
a modicum of environmental protection. But, while the general
public's ability to influence government decisions impacting
the environment is limited, pro-development groups are able to
influence government decisions with a minimum of active
participation in the formal EIS process. This premise rests on
the following hypotheses:
1. Public participation in the formal EIS process makes for a
comprehensive and effective assessment of potential
environmental impacts.
2. The fragmented nature of the formal EIS and decision-making
processes serve to isolate the decision-makers from the
demands and concerns of the general public, and from the
demands and concerns of decision-makers and technical experts
in other branches of government.
3. Said isolation and fragmentation serves to protect the
interests of social elites at the expense of sound
environmental management.
4. Tools outside the formal EIS process, which are accessible
through activist political organizing, allow community groups
to leverage enough power to influence other actors and
institutions which in turn are able to "coerce" a modicum of
environmental protection.
My basic argument is that government attempts to
manipulate public participation in the EIS process in Puerto
Rico result in: (1) public policy that is not environmentally
sound; or (2) in expensive delays that do not serve
economic-development or environmental-protection objectives;
or (3) in more or less sound environmental decisions that are
forced on policy-making agencies by frustrated and un-trusting
communities, jeopardizing the agency's public standing and
credibility. The inverse and complementary argument is that an
open and empowering attitude towards public participation
would result in effective and efficient policy-making
processes and environmental-protection policies that do not
compromise economic development.
My research is based on two case-studies. The first case-
study is of the EIS process for the Ballena Development
Corporation-Club Med proposal for a tourist development in
Guinica, for which the formal EIS process has been completed.
The second case is the study of the attempt to amend the
existing EIS Regulations and an analysis of the substance of
the proposed amendments. I pay particular attention to the
level and effectiveness of public participation in the Bahia
Ballena EIS process, and to the institutional barriers /
support-mechanisms that affected such participation. I also
examine the public's use of tools and mechanisms outside the
institutional process and the effectiveness of this strategy
in influencing the final decision. In the case of the
amendments I pay attention to inter-agency dynamics, to the
proposed amendments' possible impact on the balance of power
between the state and private development interest, and the
potential impacts of the amendments on the public's ability to
participate effectively in the process.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS RESEARCH
Public participation in planning in general, and in
environmental planning and policy-making in particular, is as
thoroughly researched a subject as any in the planning
profession. But, as students of planning, as well as
professional practitioners we should never feel complacent
that "enough research has been done already." This is
specially true in regard to the very dynamic and context-
sensitive topic of the politics of citizen participation.
I must point out that while the subject has been
thoroughly researched in the United States (research that I
rely on to build a theoretical framework) in Puerto Rico it
has not. In fact, the amendments to the EIS Regulations
mentioned above are being proposed despite the lack of
systematic evaluation by Puerto Rico's government,
environmental groups, or any other research organization on
the effectiveness of the EIS process in general, or of public
participation in the process in particular. Research on the
broader topic of citizen participation in planning is also
scant.
The importance of this research is not limited to the
value of evaluating public participation in the EIS process in
Puerto Rico. The lack of the Puerto Rican government's
commitment to public participation that I have documented
through this research, in my opinion, is a reflection of their
lack of commitment to public participation in planning in
general. In this regard, my research comes to (partially) fill
a major vacuum. The work is intended to help Puerto Rican
planners and government policy-makers in framing planning as
a social process of ascertaining needs, and desires, of
proposing and testing alternatives, to conceive it as a
political not a technical problem. Planning is a social
process in which public participation in every stage is
crucial for the satisfactory completion of the process.
METHODOLOGY
For this work I chose to use the case-study method
because it allows me to retain and reflect the full range of
dynamics and characteristics of the real-life situation. Case
studies are the preferred methodology "when 'how' and 'why'
questions are being posed, when the investigator has little
control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary
phenomenon within some real-life context." (Yin, 1984, p. 13)
According to Yin (1984) there are six sources of case-
study evidence. These are: (1) documentation (e.g. letters,
memoranda, agendas, minutes, written reports, administrative
documents, formal studies or evaluations, newsclippings); (2)
archival records (e.g. organizational records, maps, charts,
survey data, personal records); (3) surveys and interviews;
(4) direct observation; (5) participant observation; and (6)
physical artifacts. For this research I used three of these
six possible sources, these are: documentation, archival
records, and interviews. I obtained access to documentation
and archival records from, and conducted interviews with all
three parties involved in the Bahia Ballena EIS process: (1)
developers, (2) government agencies, and (3) non-government
organizations and the participating public at large.
Appendix I, Sources, contains a list of all the documents
that I reviewed. I obtained most of the newspaper articles
listed in the appendix from the files of Misi6n Industrial
(Industrial Mission) and the Puerto Rican Conservation
Foundation. The appendix also contains a list of all the
persons that I interviewed, the person's affiliation, and the
date of the interview. All interviews were guided by open-
ended questionnaires that I prepared for each individual and
that were tailored to what I knew of that person' s involvement
in either or both cases. The interviews were conducted in
Spanish (except that of Mr. Kenneth Niddrie, Ballena
Development Corporation), and lasted from forty-five minutes
to two hours. I attempted to conduct some fifty interviews
(from an original list of fifteen persons, which grew as the
research progressed) but was only able interview thirty, most
of whom were involved in both case-studies conducted.
I employed the three dominant case-study analytic
techniques: pattern matching, explanation building, and time
series analysis. (Yin, 1984) Patterns are matched (or not)
comparing field results with the results predicted by
theoretical propositions. Explanations are built by
stipulating the links that cause patterns to match. Case
chronologies serve to capture causal linkages over time. (Yin,
1984)
Working with a set of hypotheses, and studying planning
and political-science theory, the history of planning in
Puerto Rico, and Ley 9, I developed a theoretical proposition
(see Chapters 2 and 3) that I then tested through the case-
studies. In studying the research findings I prepared a
chronology for each case-study in order to capture causal
linkages. In writing each case-study I attempted to show how
the field results matched or not the theoretical propositions,
and to build explanations for the match or lack thereof.
In designing the research I have attempted to follow the
multiple-case approach, considered more robust than
traditional single-case research. (Yin, 1984) The approach
relies on replication logic. There are two kinds of
replication: theoretical replication, when the results differ
from one case to another because of predictable reasons; and
literal replication, when similar results are obtained across
cases. (Yin, 1984)
The two case-studies in the research are complimentary.
As I stated above, one deals with an instance of EIS, the
other with the government's attempt to amend the EIS
Regulations. In amending regulations or a law, a government
attempts to give legal weight to its current understanding of
the policy's objectives. Using these two case-studies allows
me to make generalizations about the dynamics of public
participation and the government's attitude towards it that
might not have been possible otherwise. If the first case-
study (the Bahia Ballena EIS) proved (or disproved) my
hypotheses, and the second case-study (amending the EIS
Regulations) did likewise, the results of the first case-study
could not be easily discarded as a "unique" case.
One last issue related to methodology I feel that I must
bring to the reader's attention is that in using the case
study method the "investigator' s goal is to expand and
generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to
enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)." (Yin,
1984, p. 21) While the case-study method may not allow one the
"precision" of quantitative research methodologies,
conclusions reached through rigorous case-study research can
be as illuminating, if not more so, than more traditional
quantitative methods. Quantitative-research data are not
manipulation-proof, neither are case-study data. Fault in
reaching conclusions from a given set of data, quantitative or
qualitative, lies not on the method but on the researcher.
THESIS ORGANIZATION
Immediately following this introduction is a chapter that
provides a theoretical-historical frame of reference. In the
chapter I lay out, in summarized form, the evolution towards
political pluralism and the political-science and planning
theory explanations for public participation in the policy-
making process. Also in summarized form, I present the
historical evolution of planning in Puerto Rico. And, using
this theoretical-historical base I provide a frame of
reference to analyze planning praxis in Puerto Rico and to
develop the theoretical propositions that in further chapters
I attempt to prove.
In Chapter 3, Puerto Rico's Environmental Public Policy
Act, I present the goals and substance of Ley 9 and the EIS
Regulations. This is necessary to provide the reader with an
understanding of the law and its intention, which enables you
to critically read and evaluate the rest of the work, my
conclusions, and recommendations.
In Chapter 4, I present the reader with the history of
the Bahia Ballena development proposal which serves as the
base case-study for the thesis. As the reader will see, I
chose to start this history with development attempts dating
back to the early 1970s and not just the 1986 EIS. This, in my
opinion, was necessary to provide you with the truest possible
picture. While the 1986 EIS process is very illuminating as to
the government's attitude towards public participation in
development-planning and impact assessment, I think you will
agree that what happened before 1986 is as relevant if not
more so.
Chapter 5 deals with the proposed amendments to the EIS
Regulations. In it I provide a brief, even sketchy, chronology
of the process by which the amendments were drafted. After
which I proceed to analyze the proposed amendments emphasizing
on their impact on the public's ability to participate in the
EIS process, and on the implications the amendments would have
had on the Bahia Ballena EIS process as a way to look at how
EISs could be handled under an amended set of regulations. I
use such emphasis, and an analysis of the government's vis a
vis private development interests' power over the process, to
shed light on the intent of the proposed amendments.
In the final chapter I present my conclusions and
recommendations. In the conclusions I summarize the lessons to
be learned from the Bahia Ballena EIS and the public's role in
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it, and generalize implications for the EIS process in
particular and planning in general. The recommendations
provide alternatives to make a reality of the Ley 9's intent
of creating a planning mechanism. And, going beyond the
public's role as defined by Ley 9 and the EIS Regulations, I
make recommendations to enhance such participation in a way
that reflects the public's increased demand for participation
and ability to participate.
SOME FINAL NOTES
Regarding the use of acronyms: All government agencies in
Puerto Rico have official names in both Spanish and English.
For the most part I use the English name and acronym. There
are some agencies mentioned in the work for which I was not
able to get the official English name, trying to be as
accurate as possible, I chose to use their Spanish name and
acronyms (my translation of their name is provided in
parenthesis). Non-government agencies, however, usually do not
translate their names into English, for some it is a political
stand. If the organization translates its name I use the
English one, if not, the Spanish name and provide a
translation in parenthesis. Also note that once an acronym is
introduced in the text, I continue using it in subsequent
chapters without further clarification. To aid the reader, I
provide in Appendix IV a list of the acronyms used and their
meaning.
Regarding translated quotes: Many quotes used in the text
are my translation of a Spanish original. In a footnote I
provide the Spanish original. In the footnote often times I
use a longer quote in order to provide the context -- in such
cases the quoted part is in italics. In the case of the EIS
Regulations and proposed amendments the reader will notice
that the language of the EIS Regulations in effect is not
translated while that of the proposed amendments is. This is
because I was able to obtain an English copy of the EIS
Regulations, and of Ley 9, but not of the proposed amendments.
Regarding last names: In Puerto Rico, as is the case in
Spain and throughout Latin America, people use their mother's
maiden name after the father's last name. Both are apellidos
(last names). That is why many Puerto Rican and Latin
Americans use a hyphenated last name in the United States,
where a hyphen is necessary so that legal and official
documents contain one's full name. But in Puerto Rico, Spain
and Latin America, not everyone uses both last names in
anything other than official documents. Without using a
hyphen, I use both last names when the person that I am
alluding uses both. Roberto SAnchez Vilella, ex governor and
the author of one article that I make reference to, is one
such person. SAnchez is his father's last name, not a middle
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name to be converted into an initial. If the reader wants to
look for articles or books written by him, s/he must keep this
in mind that Roberto S. Vilella is someone else.
Regarding references and sources: When making reference to
articles, books, etc., I use the standard form -- in
parenthesis, author's last name followed by the date of
publication, and page number if identifying the source of a
direct quote. In the case of making reference to newspaper
articles, I do not provide the author's name, instead the date
of publication is preceded by newspaper's name. When the
source is a document found through the research (e.g. letters,
memoranda) the author's name is followed by the word
"Documents." I identify government documents, other than
memoranda or letters, with the document's title (if there is
one) and the identification number assigned by the originating
agency, such as Suplemento al DIA JCA-76-004(JP), 1987. Such
documents are in the Documents section of the list of sources,
Appendix I. The format is the same with the word "Interview"
when the reference is to an interview conducted through the
research. Court decision, laws, and regulations are
identified throughout the text in standard form.
As far as I know this is the first attempt at
systematically analyzing public participation in the EIS
process in Puerto Rico. It is far from an exhaustive work. At
best it will serve to generate a discussion on the role of
impact assessment in planning environmentally-sensitive
development and the public's ability to contribute to this.
Hopefully, it will also generate rival as well as
complementary hypotheses to be researched and tested. Many
other attempts will be required before we are able to get a
grasp on the matter. The work ought to be approached with this
in mind.
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A THEORETICAL-HISTORICAL FRAME OF REFERENCE
POLITICAL PLURALISM AND PARTICIPATORY PLANNING
Due to increasing pressures from labor, the civil rights
movement, organized communities and other interest groups,
after World War II, western democracies moved towards
increased citizen participation in the policy-making process.
This participatory approach has come to be known as political
pluralism. It represents a move from viewing the law as the
embodiment of the public interest to viewing it as setting the
framework for social groups to interact in order to determine
the public interest, from substantive to procedural-
administrative law. In the United States, during and after the
1960s, this change in how public policy is made became so
pronounced that it has been characterized as the emergence of
a second republic. (Lowi, 1979.)
Tracing their heritage to James Madison, its advocates
and theorists see pluralist policy-making as a strategy to
avoid a democratic tyranny, the tyranny of the majority.
(Truman, 1970) Political pluralism posits that society is
composed of many different groups of conflicting interests,
some organized, others not. Membership in these groups is
overlapping, therefore interests within a group can be in
conflict. These intra-group conflicts and the existence of
rules of the game, such as a
belief in democracy and a sense of fair play, the theory
postulates, serve to mediate power differences among the
groups. If group composition is sharply defined along class,
ethnic, or caste lines the rules will be interpreted
differently by the different groups and conflict will ensue.
(Truman, 1970) Thus, according to the theory, as long as all
accept the rules of the game and groups have overlapping
membership, public participation guarantees that all sides
will be heard and taken into account.
The planning profession has evolved in a course parallel
to the change towards pluralism. Today planning is widely
recognized as a political endeavour, but such was not always
the case. Until recently planning theory framed professional
praxis as a technical problem, a series of rational choices in
designing the "best" solution. Today, managing the political
give-and-take is recognized as the principal task of the
planning process. Planning is framed as mediation of conflicts
in a participatory political process. (Willeke, 1974; Susskind
and Weinstein, 1980; Susskind, 1983; Susskind and Ozawa, 1984
and 1985; Wondoleck, 1985; Forester, 1989) The planner, in the
words of Langley Keyes a "Prince-Technocrat," concerns
her/himself with working out an implementable solution. This
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change has also been described in terms of a change in the
place where planning happens, from the "City Functional" of
the 1930s to the "City Grassrooted" of the 1960s. (Hall, 1989)
Traditionally, citizen participation has been conceived
as an opportunity, provided by the state, to comment on
centrally conceived plans prepared by government officers, or
private development plans that the state supports and brings
to the public for comment. Public participation thus,
traditionally has been reactive; citizens are consulted on a
possible government action, not in order to define government
actions. Public hearings are a conventional form that reactive
public participation in policy-making takes. Such hearings are
formalistic, intimidating, discourage participation by many,
and are not trusted by citizens. (Checkoway, 1981; and
Ortolano, 1984)
For public participation to be effective it must start as
early as possible in the decision-making process. Informal
workshops and small meetings, or large meetings divided for
small-group discussions are the most effective ways of
involving citizens in the process. (Ortolano, 1984) But
government officials continue to be reluctant to move in such
a direction. Some are ideologically opposed to policy-making
by non-elected citizens. But the costs of citizen
participation, in terms of time and money, and the difficulty
maintaining citizens involved for the long haul also are
barriers to effective citizen involvement programs. (Susskind,
1976)
Public participation programs have been categorized in
various ways by different authors concerned with planning.
(See Arnstein, 1969; Susskind and Elliot, 1981; Ortolano,
1984) Citizen participation can be an empowering process by
which citizens effectively influence policy decisions, a
strategy to pacify citizens, or a formalistic ritual aimed
only at complying with legal requirements. Arnstein provides
us with an eight rung ladder to categorize citizen
participation, from manipulation to citizen control. (Arnstein,
1969) Arnstein's eight-rung ladder is divided in three
categories: non-participation (1. manipulation, 2.therapy);
tokenism (3. informing, 4. consultation, 5. placation); and
citizen power (6. partnership, 7. delegated power, and 8.
citizen control). (Arnstein, 1969.) To achieve co-production
(a partnership in Arnstein's terms) all sides must accept the
legitimacy of each other's involvement. (Susskind and Elliot,
1981)
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING
The need for pluralistic approaches to environmental
policy is explained by the subjective nature of our
relationship to the environment and the role of non-objective
judgements in assessing environmental impacts. (See: Bacow,
1981; Hardy, 1981; Irland, 1975; Langston, 1979; Susskind and
Dunlap, 1981; Canan and Hennessy, 1982; Caldwell, 1982;
Susskind, 1983; Ortolano, 1984; Ortolano et al, 1987; Paehlke,
1988.) Participating in the environmental policy-making
process, individuals seek to "determine the common values and
purposes that hold them together as a community." (Sagoff,
1989, p. 100) Only the affected community can place a value on
the impacts of development decisions over the community's
environment. (Ortolano, 1984)
In valuing the possible environmental impacts of
development decisions, individuals and communities, however,
are not involved in some form of accounting. They are
expressing moral values and preferences, a moral rationality
not a quantitative rationality. (Sagoff, 1989) The "true"
impact of development decisions cannot, then, be determined
through scientific, quantitative, means and criteria -- be
these economic, ecologic, biological, physical or chemical.
The only way to define the "true" environmental impact of
development decisions is to ascertain how such impact is
perceived by the affected community. In other words, to
determine how does the change fit into the value system that
holds the community together.1
PIANNING IN PUERTO RICO
Before the United States invaded Puerto Rico in 1898,
urban development was tightly regulated by the Spanish Crown.
This was essential militarily and politically for the conquest
to proceed efficiently. During the period following the U.S.
invasion until the 1930s there was virtually no urban planning
carried out by the American colonial governors. (Montoulieu
Garcia, 1974) This changed during the 1930s after
responsibility to administer the colony was transferred from
the War Department to the Department of the Interior in 1934.
Basic to this change was the Chard6n Plan 2 which served to
organize the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration (PRRA) .
The PRRA reorganized the sugar cane industry, initiated
cooperative experiments in other agricultural sectors, and
attempted to address the problems of rural housing. The PRRA's
Planning Division served as proving grounds for the small
group of well connected, educated, middle class, young men
1 By this I do not mean to play down the sciences' usefulness
in quantifying the extent of environmental damage. Nor do I mean to
imply that if the community does not consider the possible impacts
to be significant they are insignificant. I only seek to emphasize
the degree of irrelevance of science to decision-making processes
that are fundamentally political and influenced by economic
interests and ideology.
2 Report of the Puerto Rico Policy Committee, U.S. Department
of the Interior, Washington, D.C., 1934.
that in time would be in charge of Puerto Rico's central
planning agency.
In 1941 Rexford G. Tugwell, an adamant advocate of
planning, was named governor of Puerto Rico. Tugwell conceived
planning as the state' s fourth power (alongside the executive,
legislative, and judicial powers). (Tugwell, 1953) Tugwell's
efforts to implement a planning program were supported by Luis
Mufioz Marin, who was at the time President of the Puerto Rico
Senate and would later be the first elected governor in the
colony's history. Only a year after becoming governor, in
1942, Tugwell signed Puerto Rico's basic planning law (Law 213
of May 12, 1942) through which the Puerto Rico Planning Board
was created and placed under direct control of the colonial
governor.
Law 213 has been amended numerous times since its
creation. The latest major revision came in 1975 (Law No. 75
June 24, 1975). The Planning Board remains under direct
control of the governor who names its three members. These
three individuals are at the same time the agency's top three
executive officers. Although Law No. 75 was enacted in the era
of pluralist policy-making, its public participation
requirements are limited. The Planning Board can name a
Citizens Advisory Council. But this Council has no powers
other than advisory; its functions, responsibilities and
prerogatives are contained in a single paragraph (Title III,
Article 11, No.27).
The 1975 law, as did the original 1942 Planning Act,
encourages, but does not require, the Planning Board to form
local (municipal) and regional Planning Commissions, but it is
up to the Planning Board to decide on membership (how many and
who) and to define the functions of these local and regional
entities. Otherwise, citizen participation requirements are
limited to consultation through public hearings. During the
mid-1960s the first local planning commissions were organized.
Some ten years later, in 1976, even the most active ones were
considered to be a failure:
"members can be observed to have negative attitudes
for effective participation in the process. These
attitudes are: lack of enthusiasm, a sense of
impotence, fatalism, and a devalued self-image. "3
Lack of a consensus among the national political leadership on
the need and importance of public participation; the absence
of a participatory tradition in Puerto Rican politics; the
basic authoritarian nature of Puerto Rican society; and
3 "Aun en aquellas Comisiones Locales m~s activas es
observable en sus miembros actitudes negativas para una efectiva
participaci6n en el proceso de planificaci6n. Estas actitudes son:
falta de entusiasmo, sentido de impotencia, frustraci6n, fatalismo
y una auto-imagen desvalorizada. Etiony Aldarondo, 1976, Reporte a
la Junta de Planificaci6n de Puerto Rico, quoted in Ortiz Quihonez,
1983, p.11.
administrative agencies structured to be only responsive to
the head administrator, the lider dnico (lone leader, the term
used by Ortiz Quifonez), are all cited as reasons for the
ineffectiveness of these local commissions. (Ortiz Quift6nez,
1983)
Another factor which I consider very important and that
bears directly on the political leadership's lack of
commitment to public participation is the highly partisan
nature of Puerto Rican politics. In Puerto Rico all elected
officers (Municipal Assemblies, Mayors, State Representatives,
Senators, the Resident Commissioner to Washington, and the
Governor) are elected simultaneously every four years, and a
great majority of the people vote for a party slate. Only
twice in the last 30 years, as far as I know, have the Senate
and the House of Representatives in Puerto Rico not been
controlled by the same party as the governor's. The result of
this combination of factors has been that one party or another
controls the executive and legislative branches at the
national level as well as in most towns and cities. This
political control at all levels by a single, unified party
aligns most structural sources of political power with a
single platform; inter- and intra-government policy disputes
are repressed or concealed.
Also contributing to the lack of commitment to effective
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public participation strategies is the centralization of
government services. Until the 1940s, government services like
road construction, police, public schools, public health,
utilities, and fire-fighting were administered by the
municipalities. Today, municipal control of these services is
minimal or none. According to Roberto SAnchez Vilella,
governor from 1968 to 1972, the change is due to two reasons:
First, is a matter of resources. Resource-poor municipalities
began transferring these responsibilities to the central
government in order for things to be done properly. Secondly,
the unpleasant task of taxing residents has been avoided by
municipal elected officers, not abrogated but surrendered in
practice. (SAnchez Vilella, 1983)
Along with the loss of local government control over the
provision of local services inevitably comes loss of control
over planning. Municipal government organizations are now
limited to "... backing the Legislative Assembly through their
representatives, to have the greater amount of funds possible
assigned ..." to the appropriate departments and
administrative agencies. (SAnchez Vilella, 1983, p. 21)
Municipal governments are not inclined to plan for local
services since the municipal government will not be the one to
implement such plans. Thus the level of government closest to
the citizen and the community, and therefore the best situated
to conduct participatory planning, has few reasons to embark
in such activities.
CONCLUSIONS
Planning is fundamentally a social process of
ascertaining social needs, goals and desires; of diagnosing
problems, developing alternatives, and implementing solutions.
Interaction with people in each of this stages is necessary
for the process is not of a technical or mathematical nature.
(Willeke, March 1974) "The right course of action is always a
matter of choice, not of fact." (Davidoff, 1965, p. 332) When
concerned with environmental issues, government officials must
recognize the value-oriented nature of the conflict and act
accordingly " ... facilitating joint fact-finding, aimed at
producing an informed resolution of the conflict." (Susskind,
1983, p. 7)
Pluralist approaches, however, are not the panacea that
its advocates would have us believe. The theory's premise that
the rules of the game are equally benign to all social groups
does not consider the social-economic-political reality that
the rules are fashioned according to the world view of the
dominant groups, "... those who benefit over time from the
operation of social, economic, and political structures."
(Alford and Friedland, 1975, p.431). Power and participation
are independent; political participation by non-dominant
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interests can be " ... a means of reproducing the absence of
power." (Alford and Friedland, 1975, p.474, emphasis in
original.) Elites are able to control the pluralist policy-
making process even if they do not participate in it by virtue
of their socio-economic position.
In Puerto Rico, planning has not been an instrument aimed
at empowering citizens through participatory processes, but
more so a process by which the powerlesness of powerless
groups is reproduced. Public hearings -- intimidating,
discouraging participation by many, and not trusted by
citizens (Checkoway, 1981; and Ortolano, 1984) -- are the
favored form of public participation. In Puerto Rico's
authoritarian, political culture, the strategy's flaws,
identified above, are magnified. But, these "flaws" may in
fact be considered strengths by the political and economic
elites, reluctant to share power.
During Spanish colonial times, planning was but an
instrument of colonization. Since the revival of planning in
the 1930s, it has been, at best, the prerogative of social
elites, exercised through technocratic, top-down means. I will
show how, faced with this reality, community groups have to
act through non-official channels in order to have their view
of nature, their assessment of environmental impacts, and
their interest heard in the process of choosing the "right"
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course of action. The effectiveness of this outside strategy,
the political support that through it they are able to muster,
and their ability to force the state into complying with its
own laws and administrative requirements determines the extent
to which community values and interests are taken into account
in the policy-making process.
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PUERTO RICO'S ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC POLICY ACT
In Puerto Rico, and in the United States, during the late
1960s there were legislative initiatives, independent of each
other, responding to widespread social demand for
environmental protection, to establish a public policy on the
environment. At the time, in Puerto Rico, administrative and
regulatory responsibilities for the environment were divided
among a number of agencies. For example: the Department of
Public Health was responsible to monitor and regulate air
quality, the department of agriculture had responsibility for
forest management, the Department of Public Works and the
Planning Board shared a number of other environmental
management responsibilities. This changed during the early
1970s when the Puerto Rico Environmental Quality Board (EQB)
and the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) were created.
In 1970 the United States Congress enacted the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) .1 NEPA was a product of its
time, the act created an administrative agency, the
Environmentally Quality Council (EQC), and charged it with
responsibility to protect the environment through pluralist
strategies. NEPA requires the federal government to take into
account the environmental impact of " ... major federal actions
1 42 U.S.C. Section 4321 et.seq.
significantly affecting the environment... ", 2 and requires
public participation in the process of assessing those
impacts. 3 Federal environmental legislation and public
participation go hand in hand. During the 1970s no federal
environmental legislation was enacted that did not include a
public participation component. (Paehlke, 1988)
Once the federal legislation was enacted, separate, long
standing, legislative initiatives in the Puerto Rico Senate
and House of Representatives were joined and re-written to
come in line with the federal statute. (Adopting a law molded
after a federal statute is common practice in Puerto Rico, a
colony of the United States and subject to judicial review by
federal courts.) The Puerto Rico Environmental Public Policy
Act (PREPPA, popularly known as Ley 9) was enacted on June 18,
1970, and took effect on July 1st of the same year.4 Section
2 of the Act states its purpose as follows:
"To establish a public policy which shall stimulate
a desirable and convenient relationship between man
and his environment; to develop the efforts which
might hinder or eliminate damages to the
environment and to the biosphere and to stimulate
2 42 U.S.C. Section 4332(2) (b).
3 42 U.S.C. Section 4332 (2) (c) (v)
4 Puerto Rico Environmental Public Policy Act, Law No. 9 of
June 18, 1970. Later amended by Law No. 72 of May 31, 1973; Law No.
23 of April 29, 1974; Law No. 25 of July 10, 1978; Law No. 38 of
October 5, 1983; Law No. 49 of June 7, 1984; Law No. 31 of June 13,
1985; and Law No. 2 of September 25, 1986.
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the health and welfare of man; to enrich the
comprehension of the ecological systems and natural
resources which are important to Puerto Rico and to
establish the Environmental Quality Board. " 5
Ley 9 calls upon the Commonwealth to act as the custodian
of the environment in complying with its responsibility to
future generations; to guarantee all citizens a safe,
productive and aesthetically and culturally pleasant
environment; to use the environment for social benefit without
degrading it; to maintain an environment that offers diversity
and variety, and preserves historic, cultural and natural
aspects of the nation's heritage; to achieve a balance between
population and the use of natural resources; to improve the
quality of renewable resources and to oversee the proper use
of non-renewable ones.'
Section 4 of Title II calls upon all government
departments, agencies, instrumentalities, and political
subdivisions to interpret, apply, and administer all public
policies and laws "... in strict accordance with the public
policy set forth in this act." 7 To accomplish this, all
government institutions are directed to use an
interdisciplinary approach to guarantee the integrated use of
5 PREPPA, Title I, Section 2.
6 PREPPA, Title I, Section 3(b).
7 PREPPA, Title I, Section 4.
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natural and social sciences when making decisions that impact
the environment. Recognizing the value-oriented dimension of
the human relationship to nature, the Act calls for the
consideration of not only technical and economic elements but
also those "... not measured and evaluated economically." 8
Section 4(C) contains the Act's action-forcing mechanism, it
calls for the preparation and inclusion in every
recommendation or report on any action, decision, or
legislation which "... significantly affects the environmental
quality ... " a detailed written statement of:
" (i) the environmental impact of the proposed
legislation, of the action to be performed or the
decision to be promulgated;"
" (ii) any adverse environmental effects which
cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented, should the action be performed or the
governmental decision promulgated;"
" (iii) alternatives to the proposed legislation, or
the action or governmental decision in
consideration;"
"(iv) the relation between local short-term uses of
man's environment and the maintenance and
improvement of long-term productivity and"
" (v) any irreparable commitment of the resources
involved in the proposed legislation ... Before the
agency concerned includes or issues the proper
Environmental Impact Statement the officer in
charge shall consult and obtain the opinion that
with respect to the proposed legislation ... any
other government agency with jurisdiction ... may
have."
"Copies of such Environmental Impact Statement
8 PREPPA, Title I, Section 4 (B).
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and the opinions of the agencies consulted shall be
made available to the Board on Environmental
Quality, to the Governor ... to the public ... for
the proper process of examination and study ...
The Act's clear intent of creating a planning mechanism
that takes into account environmental values, and the EQB's
role in this, are made even more patent in Section 4(D)
whereby the EQB is authorized to:
"study, develop and describe the proper
alternatives for the course of action recommended
in any proposal which involved irresolute conflicts
in regard to alternate uses of available
resources".
The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Regulations
(discussed more in detail below) make an unequivocal statement
as the planning-mechanism nature and intent of Ley 9.
"The main purpose of an EIS is to serve as a
planning tool in order to insure that the
environmental public policy established by the law
is incorporated in the government decisional
process.""
Like the Planning Board, the EQB is composed of three
members (a President and two Associate Vice-Presidents,) named
9 PREPPA, Title I, Section 4. (C) .
10 PREPPA, Title I, Section 4 (D) .
1 EIS Regulations, Section 5.4.1.
by the governor, who at the same time serve as the agency's
top three executive officers. The EQB is authorized to develop
policy and promulgate regulations and standards to safeguard
the environment and to assure that the Act's lofty goals are
met. In this, the EQB is aided by a Consulting Council
composed of the Secretaries of Natural Resources, Public
Health, and Agriculture, the Chairman of the Planning Board,
and three representatives of the public interest named by the
Governor.
Initially, the EIS process was only regulated by
guidelines set forth in Executive Order No. 1666 of June 30,
1971 (Manual para la preparaci6n, evaluaci6n y uso de las
declaraciones de impacto ambiental). In 1984 the EIS
Regulations were promulgated.12 Developed by the EQB, the EIS
Regulations put forth procedural and content requirements for
the preparation of impact statements. The Regulations seek to
assure that the information on environmental and natural
resource impacts generated during the impact assessment
process and contained in the EIS:
"... be available to the responsible public
officials and to the citizens before decisions are
taken and actions implemented. ... in order that
necessary measures are taken to protect, restore
12 Promulgated by Resolution R-83-42-8, May 23, 1984; approved
by the Secretary of State on June 4, 1984.
and improve the environment. " 13
The impact assessment process is divided into three
parts. First, an Environmental Assessment (EA) is conducted by
the "proponent" (that agency, department, instrumentality or
political subdivision that is to make a decision or take an
action) in order to determine if a Preliminary EIS or a
Determination No Significant Impact (D-N) is required. 14
(There are instances when an the EIS is categorically
required. The criteria to automatically trigger the EIS
includes the project size and/or the fragility of the
environment over which impacts will occur.) When, through the
EA, the proponent determines that the decision or action under
consideration will have significant environmental impacts, it
must prepare a Preliminary EIS to be used in consulting and
obtaining comments from the public, the EQB, and other
government institutions. 15 Thirdly, the proponent prepares a
Final EIS answering the questions and comments raised during
the public review process.'6 While the EQB has the authority
to determine if an EA or a D-N is adequate or not, 17 and if
an EIS is needed even when the proposed decision or action do
13 EIS Regulations Section 1.2.d.
14 EIS Regulations Section 3.1.1.
15 EIS Regulations Section 2.1.i.
16 EIS Regulations Section 2.1.j.
7 EIS Regulations Sections 3.4.8. and 4.3.3. respectively.
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not meet the compulsory EIS criteria, ' its role is limited.
"The Environmental Quality Board and other agencies
specialized in environmental matters have the
opportunity to express and publish their opinions.
If they consider a Statement to be incomplete they
can point it out. If they harbor doubts about some
of its data or judgements, they may express them.
If they consider the proposal not to be advisable
from an environmental perspective, they may affirm
so. But their functions end there. The
Environmental Impact Statement procedure does not
empower them to decide. It is the proponent agency,
charged by law with responsibility over its own
program, the one called to test the weight of
environmental considerations in conjunction with
the other factors that must be considered."
". .. The total responsibility to comply with the
environmental policy of Ley 9 is left in the hands
of the proponent agency ... . "'9
Again, the EIS is a planning tool that attempts to bring
into consideration environmental values in the government
decision-making process. The participation of government
agencies without authority over the decision, and of the
18 EIS Regulation Section 5.2.3.
19 "La Junta de Calidad Ambiental y demAs agencias
especializadas en asuntos ambientales tienen la oportunidad de
expresar y publicar sus opiniones. Si consideran incompleta una
Declaraci6n podrian seftalarlo. Si abrigan dudas sobre algunos de
sus datos o juicios, podrian expresarlas. Si considerasen que lo
propuesto no es aconsejable desde el punto de vista ambiental,
podrian afirmarlo. Pero ahi acaban sus funciones. El procedimiento
de las Declaraciones de Impacto Ambiental no les faculta para
decidir. Es la agencia proponente, encargada por ley de la
responsabilidad de su propio programa, a quien compete sopesar las
consideraciones ambientales en conjuci6n con los dem~s factores que
deben tenerse en cuenta." "... Se deja en manos de la agencia
proponente la responsabilidad total de cumplir con la politica
ambiental de la Ley Num. 9." Manual para la preparaci6n, evaluaci6n
y uso de las declaraciones de impacto ambiental, Puerto Rico
Environmental Quality Board, pp. 2-3.
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general public is an attempt to make decision-makers aware of
matters that might have otherwise escaped their attention.
This information-dissemination character, and the importance
of public input is made clear through the Regulation's
requirements to have the EIS be a concise document, written in
Spanish, " ... and in terms that can be easily understood by
the community. " 20  The regulations do not require that the
public be notified of a D-N, but the document is a public
document that must be available for review upon request. 21
When a Preliminary EIS is circulated for comment among
government agencies the proponent must notify the public of
the Preliminary EIS and its availability for review and
comment.22 The public must also be notified of the Final EIS
at least 30 days before taking the proposed decision or
action, the date of publication of such notice is in fact
considered the date of issuance of the Final EIS .23
While the law and the Regulations aim to generate
informed public debate of a decision or action to be taken,
this is not attempted in a pro-active manner. For instance,
there are no requirements to have among the alternatives to be
considered one or more generated by the public through the
20 EIS Regulations Section 5.3.1.
21 EIS Regulations Section 4.3.1.
22 EIS Regulations Section 5.5.2.2.
23 EIS Regulations Section 5.5.7.
process. The public only becomes involved in the official
process after the Preliminary EIS has been prepared. While the
public must be informed of, and requested to comment on all
Preliminary and Final EISs, the same is not true of EAs and D-
Ns. And not every Preliminary EIS goes to public hearing.
According to the EIS Regulations, it is up to the proponent
agency to determine for which EIS a public hearing is
required,24 otherwise public participation is limited to
written comments in response to a notice printed in a major
daily. These in my opinion are major flaws in the law and its
implementation; flaws that run counter to the planning,
information-dissemination, and public participation objectives
of the law and the Regulations.
As I discussed in Chapter 2, the importance of public
participation in environmental policy-making is explained by
the subjective nature of our relationship to the environment
and the role of non-objective judgements in assessing
environmental impacts. While Ley 9, and its citizen
involvement requirements, were enacted to come in line with
federal law, this does not mean that the law was enacted in
the absence of a broad-based indigenous environmental movement
demanding increased participation, and carving out a space for
itself in the policy-making arena.
24 EIS Regulations Section 7.1.
In the early 1960s struggles by coastal communities to
protect sand dunes from excessive sand extraction, and by
fishermen to secure access to valuable fisheries gave birth to
the modern environmental movement. (Garcia, 1987) Contrary to
earlier environmental organizations, the modern movement was
led by poor and working class communities concerned with
immediate vindications. (Garcia, 1987) Gentrification of
coastal communities, caused by tourism growth, was and remains
one of the principal issues affecting these communities.
(Valdes Pizzinni and Chaparro, 1989) The immediacy of the
vindications sought, made these community groups (sharply
separated along class lines from government officers,
developers, and earlier environmentalists) seek alternative,
activist, political-organizing strategies to make themselves
heard. By the early 1970s the movement was sufficiently
strong and broad-based to mount one of the most massive
political campaigns of the last thirty years, the struggle
against a deep-sea super-port for oil tankers at Mona island
off Puerto Rico's West coast.
As early as the mid 1960s there was a substantial public
sector interested, capable, and involved in environmental
public policy issues. Since then the sector has grown, its
interest, awareness, and capacity heightened -- as the
following case study (Chapter 4) demonstrates. But the law and
regulations have not adapted to this new reality. In fact, as
Chapter 5 documents, government agencies are attempting to
limit the already limited public participation requirements.
TOURIST DEVELOPMENT AT BAHIA BALLENA
THE TOWN OF GUANICA
GuAnica is a small coastal town near the South-West
corner of Puerto Rico. Once a major center for refining sugar
cane and exporting refined sugar, today Gudnica is one of the
poorest communities in Puerto Rico. According to Puerto Rico's
Bureau of Employment Security, in 1985 the average monthly
unemployment for the year was 36.7%. According to the 1980
U.S. Census, of the families in GuAnica 74.9% lived in poverty
and the average family income was 35.9% lower than the island-
wide average. According to the local office of the Department
of Social Services, 80% of GuAnica families receive some kind
of government assistance.
GuAnica's economy is a stagnant economy, as municipal
data on business permits and licenses shows. During the 1976-
77 fiscal year the town raised $71,612 from municipal permits
and licenses. Ten years later, fiscal year 1986-87, Gudnica
raised only $78,801 from the same source, just slightly over
$7,000 more than ten years earlier. During that same time
period, 1976-1987, the incidence of Type I crimes (e.g.
assault, theft, murder, rape) increased by 68.7% according to
statistics kept by the Ponce Area Command of the State Police.
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Today, Gu~nica's economy is dependent on a handful of
factories, a chemical fertilizer manufacturer, small scale
agriculture, and the tourist industry. There is also a small
fishing cooperative. The fishing industry in GuAnica, as well
as in general in Puerto Rico, is an artisanal industry.(See
Gutierrez Sanchez, 1985; Gutierrez Sanchez, et al, 1985;
Valdes Pizzinni and Chaparro, 1989; Valdes Pizzinni, 1990.)
The fishing cooperative's wood-hulled fleet consists of some
25 boats, most of the boats in the fleet are 18 to 20 feet
long and none exceeds 30 feet. Most of the boats are powered
by outboard motors, about a third are row boats.
Tourism in Guinica
The tourist industry in Gudnica depends mostly on
internal tourism (Puerto Rican families on vacation), and is
based on the coastal town's dry climate, calm beaches and
natural beauty. To serve the tourists there a couple of small
hotels, three or four guest houses, apartments and houses for
rent, public camping grounds, fishermen who rent their boats
or provide transportation to and from nearby cays, small,
family-owned restaurants, convenience stores, and gift shops,
and ambulant vendors selling everything from snacks to T-
shirts and elaborate artisanal products. Many in Gudnica see
the tourist industry as the foundation on which the town's
economic development ought to be built. "The beaches will
always be here and people will come and spend their money", or
some variation of it, is heard over again when the question of
economic development is discussed with town residents and
municipal government officials.
Tourism is a growing industry in Puerto Rico. Governor
Rafael Hern~ndez Col6n has made the development of tourism a
major economic-development strategy. The governor's strategy
is to develop the tourism infrastructure outside San Juan's
metropolitan area. (Today, most of the international tourism
is centered around San Juan, the capital city.) A key project
in Herndndez Col6n's strategy was to be the private
development of a Club Med resort at a privately-owned parcel
at Bahia Ballena in Gu~nica.
Given GuAnica's dire economic situation and residents'
conviction that tourism should be the foundation on which
economic development ought to be built, one would have
expected great community support for the Club Med development
proposal. According the developers, the Club Med development
project was to create some two-hundred direct jobs during the
construction stage and another two-hundred direct, non-
management jobs during the operational stage. The construction
stage was to require an investment of ten to twelve million
dollars. After opening, the resort would have pumped millions
of dollars annually into Gudnica's depressed economy.
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(Suplemento al DIA JCA-76-004(JP), 1987) However, when the
Ballena Development Corporation's proposal was made public in
1986, it was opposed by a broad-based coalition of community
groups lead by the Comit6 Pro Rescate de Gudnica, CPRG
(Committee to Rescue GuAnica) . Don Pedro J. Vargas, who was
the Municipal Assembly Secretary until the summer of 1990 when
he was named Director of the new Oficina Municipal de Asuntos
Turisticos (Municipal Office for Tourist Affairs):
"Although we want to exploit 'touristically' the
beauty of GuAnica, this does not mean that we are
going to surrender our heritage to developments
that will only come to destroy what we have."'
THE DEVELOPMENT PROPOSAL
In 1971, Vencedor Development Corporation proposed the
development of a major tourist resort on a 173 cuerdas2 parcel
owned by Mr. John S. Moore of Greenwich, Connecticut. Located
South of Route 333 and North of Bahia Ballena beach, the
property is virtually surrounded by the scenic GuAnica State
Forest. The property extends for nearly two kilometers along
the Western half of Bahia Ballena, finishing in a narrow,
1 "Si bien nosotros queremos explotar 'turisticamente' la
belleza de GuAnica, eso no significa que nosotros vallamos a
entregar nuestra heredad a construcciones que vengan a destruir lo
que tenemos." Vargas, Interview, 1990.
2 A cuerda is an area measurement unit used in Puerto Rico
since Spanish times, 1 cuerda equals .9718 acre.
43
sandy peninsula on its extreme west point. West of this
peninsula there is a sheltered, shallow bay, mangrove cays,
and further west is the mangrove-surrounded Tartaneja Lagoon.
Near the east corner of the property there is a large coconut
plantation that extends west parallel to and some fifteen
meters from the high tide line, gets dense and ends in an
isolated stand of palm trees near the property's western end.
(See Appendix IV)
Since the parcel is zoned residential, the developers had
to request the Planning Board to re-zone through a Siting
Consultation. In order to evaluate the needed re-zoning, the
Planning Board requested an EIS as required by Ley 9. The EIS
(JCA-76-004) was prepared, submitted in 1976, circulated among
government agencies, and approved in 1977 without a public
hearing. People in GuAnica, even municipal government
officers, did not know about the development plans. In 1977,
after the Planning Board approved the Siting Consultation, the
Administraci6n de Reglamentos y Permisos, ARPE (Bureau of
Permits and Regulations) gave ante-proyecto approval.3
Vencedor Development went bankrupt before any
construction started, and was re-organized as Ballena
3 Ante-proyecto is the pre-development authorization that ARPE
extends in order for the developer to prepare construction plans
and secure financing. After construction plans are prepared ARPE
revises them and authorizes construction. After construction ARPE
inspects the development before giving occupancy permits.
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Development Corporation. The project was re-conceived and
scaled down, from a mega-project to a summer-village concept
consisting of three-hundred cabins, each for six guests, each
with a bar-b-que pit, communal sanitary and shower facilities,
parking for three-hundred cars, tennis and basketball courts,
and a central building housing a restaurant and a bar as well
as administrative offices. From January 1980 to June 1981, the
DNR submitted at least six separate non-endorsement opinions
to ARPE and the Planning Board, and on June 22, 1982
recommended that a new EIS be prepared. (Cardona, Documents,
1986) Without requiring a new EIS for the new project, in 1980
ARPE authorized extensions to the approved ante-proyecto and
in 1982 authorized the construction permit. Still, people in
Gu~nica did not know about the coming development.
Before construction got under way, in 1983 Club Med
joined the development team and a new venture was conceived.
The Club Med version proposed a two-stage development that,
when completed, would have consisted of forty-five low-rise
buildings housing four-hundred guests rooms with capacity for
eight-hundred guests, quarters for an international staff of
100, swimming pools, sports facilities, and the usual shops,
restaurants, etc. (Suplemento al DIA JCA-76-004(JP)) In 1983
ARPE approved a second three-year extension to the
construction permit. Meanwhile, GuAnica residents remained in
the dark.
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OPPOSITION TO CLUB NED
In May 1986, construction had not started and ARPE's
permit extension was due to expire. In order to proceed, the
developers requested, on May 23, a one year extension (86-59-
1025 JPU). It was approved six days later. People in Gudnica
first heard about development plans for Bahia Ballena through
press reports of a speech at Harvard University by the
governor of Puerto Rico, Rafael Hern&ndez Col6n. At Harvard,
Hern~ndez Col6n announced that his administration' s efforts to
develop the tourist industry away from San Juan had secured a
Club Med for GuAnica and construction was about to get under
way. Once people in Gudnica and environmentalists throughout
Puerto Rico found out about the project, opposition became
widespread.
The DNR continued to oppose the development of Bahia
Ballena, and again requested a new EIS. The DNR's opposition
to the project was based on the impact that the development
would have had on the forest, which in 1985 had been
designated a Biosphere Reserve of the Man And Biosphere (MAB)
program of the United Nations Educational Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) . As early as 1976 the DNR had
4 The Man and the Biosphere program was started in 1971. Its
objectives are to develop scientific knowledge towards the rational
administration and preservation of natural resources, to train
personnel competent in the field, and to circulate and popularize
such knowledge among government decision-makers as well as among
contemplated, in its master plan for forest management,
acquiring the Moore property for preservation as part of the
Gudnica State Forest.(Cardona, Documents, 1986)
The GuAnica State Forest
The forest is the only tropical deciduous forest in the
MAB program, and a major source of pride among Guhnica
residents. It was first proclaimed a State Forest in 1919 and
covered some 3,000 ha., today it covers 4,000 ha.; all of it
is managed by the DNR but portions are owned by the Autoridad
de Tierras de Puerto Rico (Puerto Rico Land Authority) . The
forest's configuration has changed through land swaps. Much of
the forest's original extensive sea-front has been lost
through these swaps, today the remaining 20 Km of coast and
beaches are visited by some 20,000 people during the summer
months. During the 1930s shepherding and wood collection were
allowed in the forest. During that time the Civil Conservation
Corps developed the forest's infrastructure and planted
mahogany, which due to the dry conditions could not thrive.
Over the last forty years the forest has been off limits for
wood collection, shepherding and subsistence agriculture.
(Canals Mora, undated B.)
Ninety per cent of the forest is located over sedimentary
the population at large. UNESCO, Qu6 es el programa MAB, undated.
rock formations, mostly limestone. Rainfall is seasonal,
varying from 1" in the average dry season (January to March),
to 16" in the average rainy season (August to November). The
soil and low rainfall make for a very dry environment
dominated by deciduous species, thorn scrub woodlands, beach
shrubs, and a considerable mangrove forest that borders the
Tartaneja Lagoon, located West of Bahia Ballena. There are 700
plant species, 246 of which are trees. Forty-five of the plant
species are rare or endangered, sixteen of them endemic.
(Canals Mora, undated B)
The forest provides habitat to, or is visited by, forty-
five threatened, endangered, or rare species, sixteen of them
endemic. Among these are sea turtles (hawksbills,
leatherbacks, and green turtles) and mammals (manatee),
reptiles, and birds. There are forty resident bird species in
the forest (35% of resident bird species in Puerto Rico) nine
of them endemic. The forest is visited by most migratory bird
species that stop in Puerto Rico, including the American
Peregrine Falcon, the American Osprey, and the West Indian
Ruddy Duck. Bird species, specially resident species, are
mostly insectivorous adapted to the dry climate and its
reliable and stable population of insects. The forest's bird
population is considered to be denser than that of the rain
forests of Maricao and El Yunque, both in Puerto Rico. (Canals
Mora, un-dated A)
Hawksbill turtles (Eretmochelys imbricata, an endangered
species) are known to nest on the white sand beaches of Bahia
Ballena. The sapo concho (Peltophryne lemur, an endangered
species) is a small frog, endemic to Puerto Rico, whose only
known spawning lagoon is formed by heavy rains once every
eighteen to twenty-four months near the Eastern corner of
Bahia Ballena, some fifty meters from the beach. Another
prominent inhabitant is the guabairo (Caprimulgus vociferus,
an endangered species) an endemic bird whose only known
habitat is this forest. (Canals Mora, undated A) These three
species became the symbols of the community's struggle against
the state government, Ballena Development Corporation, and
Club Med.
Community Opposition
The CPRG is a long standing all-volunteer grassroots
organization that works on environmental and community
development issues. After Herndndez Col6n's speech at Harvard
in 1986, the CPRG approached the municipal administration for
information about the project, but town officials did not have
any information or were not willing to share what they knew.
They tried to obtain a copy of the EIS from the EQB and were
told that only one copy was available at the EQB headquarters
and that it had been prepared in 1976 and approved in 1977.
With the help of Miguel Canals Mora, resident biologist in
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charge of the GuAnica State Forest, the CPRG set out to
organize a campaign to stop the project.
Canals Mora had first heard of the development plans
shortly before it was made public while in a meeting at DNR
headquarters where it was mentioned in passing. Although he is
the forest's resident biologist and, as such, has
responsibility for its management, he had never been
approached for his opinion in regards to the proposed
development. According to Canals Mora, although the DNR
opposed to the development project, the project had never been
brought up for comments to the department's Forest Service
Division. Unable to address his concerns through official DNR
channels, he worked with the CPRG to advance what should have
been treated as an "official" position. 5
Momentum built rapidly. While the governor, the district
state representative, the Office of Tourist Development, and
members of the Planning Board made statements favoring the
project and defending the decision to approve the project
s Because of his actions against the development of Bahia
Ballena in and outside the DNR Canals mora was ostracized. His
proposals for improving the forest's infrastructure and developing
educational programs were held at DNR's Planning Division, which
must approve such proposals before they are sent to possible
funding sources. A salary increase that was due to him was not
approved. The boat that was assigned to him to patrol the forest's
coastline was taken away. And the DNR Rangers detachment assigned
to the forest was re-assigned to the Regional DNR office. (Canals
Mora, Interview, 1990)
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without a new EIS, the CPRG was successfully turning Bahia
Ballena's development into a national issue. Ms. Lina Dueho,
Executive Vice President and spoke-woman for the Planning
Board, insisted all through the Summer that a new EIS was not
needed because of the lower land-use intensity of the new
proposal and that this was standard procedure. Other
government agencies hailed the economic bonanza Club Med would
make possible.
The CPRG-lead coalition based its opposition on three
arguments:
Ecological: The Gudnica State Forest is a very fragile
environment. The development threatened to disrupt habitat
that is ecologically part of the forest, albeit not
administratively. The inevitable use of pesticides would have
had major negative impacts on the food chain. Gudnica's water
supply capacity to serve the project was doubtful. Increased
traffic on narrow Route 333 would require widening the road,
and a new road through the forest was being championed by the
mayor of nearby Yauco. Illumination and noises would disrupt
sea turtles nesting at Bahia Ballena beach. The sapo concho
spawning lagoon was threatened by a proposed parking facility.
Economics. The construction-stage employment and cost figures
were questioned. The operational-stage jobs available to
Guhnica residents were to be low wage, dead end jobs. Since
Club Med hires an international management and direct service
staff in order to create a cosmopolitan atmosphere, Gudnica
residents could only hope to work as maids, gardeners and
dishwashers.' Club Med was committed to hiring Puerto Ricans
to work in management and direct service positions at resorts
6 Club Med functions like a private club. What they call
Gentile Organizers (GOs) are hired to organize and lead group
activities. These Gentile Organizers mix and fraternize with the
"Club members" (guests) at all times. GOs bring the family-style
dinner to the table, organize games, trips, etc., other than being
visibly identified as GOs they behave as in vacation themselves.
(Niddrie, Interview, 1990)
elsewhere in the world but they would need to be (according to
Club Med requirements) young, athletic, single, willing to
move every six months, and able to speak fluently three
languages -- not many in Gudnica would qualify. Fishermen were
concerned about continued access to the reef-sheltered waters
west of Ballena where they usually go for bait.
Moral. Word spread rapidly that Club Med resorts allow nude
bathing. This became a major issue for religious organizations
(out of proportion to its significance given Puerto Rico's
strict anti-nudity laws), which mobilized great numbers to
marches and other CPRG-sponsored events.7
By the end of the Summer of 1986 the organizing work of
the CPRG and Canals Mora was paying off. On September 22 a
manifest against the development signed by all faculty members
of the Biology Department of the University of Puerto Rico,
Rio Piedras, was published in the Readers' Viewpoint section
of the San Juan Star. On that same day El Mundo, a major daily
that normally aligns its editorial position with Hern~ndez
Col6n' s Partido Popular Democrdtico (Popular Democratic Party)
editorialized asking for public hearings on the matter,
7 I feel compelled to make here a very personal and
ideological observation in regards to the moral issue. I do not
share the moral value assigned to clothed bathing and the view of
nudism as sinful. Those who think that way have a right to express
their opinion, and the CPRG was right in entering into a tactical
alliance with them. But they did not stop there. Some so called
"progressive" individuals in blatant opportunistic fashion, used
the moral value system of others to advance their un-related
arguments. The CPRG went beyond building an alliance with
conservative, even reactionary, moral groups. CPRG members also
played to homophobic hysteria by describing international Club Med
staff as homosexuals who would corrupt the morals of Gu~nica's
youth and bring on an AIDS epidemic. For their unfounded and taste-
less slander, CPRG members were officially reproached through a
Gu~nica Municipal Assembly Resolution. Their actions could not have
but compromised their credibility and standing.
something that the Hern~ndez Col6n administration was opposed
to. And Puerto Rico' s Natural History Society, usually a quiet
organization, was also demanding public hearings and a new
EIS.
The debate had become increasingly personal and nasty.
Government and developers representatives accused the
opposition of being a communist plot -- many in the CPRG
leadership belong to the Partido Socialista Puertorriqueho
(Puerto Rican Socialist Party). They argued that with the
economic bonanza that Club Med would bring to the town,
Santana Ronda and the PSP would loose their audience. In turn,
the CPRG accused the developers of greed, bad faith, and lying
to the people. Resentment still lingers. In an interview on
August, 24, 1990, Kenneth Niddrie, Ballena Development's
spokeman and project architect, blamed the project's failure
to "a lot of bitching and moaning", and called DNR staff "the
worst bunch of back-biters and empire builders." On November
20, the EQB changed its position and requested a Supplement to
the EIS.
THE EIS-SUPPLEMENT PROCESS
In response to the EQB request for a Supplement to the
1976 EIS, the Planning Board suspended all action on the
project. On December 19, 1986, a scoping meeting was held at
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Planning Board headquarters. 8 The meeting was attended by
representatives of the Planning Board, the DNR, the Water and
Sewage Authority, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (U.S.
FWS), and Ballena Development Corporation (it is standard
practice not to invite community organizations or other
citizens to these scoping meetings). Four major assessment
areas were identified: (1) flora and fauna; (2) water supply;
(3) archeology; and (4) flooding. The change in policy was
made public on 18 January 1987 through a press release
according to which the developers had sixty days to prepare
and submit the EIS-Supplement. (Caribbean Business, January
18, 1987)
The CPRG, environmental and community organizations, and
many in the scientific community, were convinced that the
project was a bad idea. CPRG member Pedro Santana Ronda: "We
did not need a new EIS to know how bad the idea was. If we had
known about the original project we would have opposed it
then." 9 The Asociaci6n de Duehos de Paradores (Association of
Parador Owners, small, locally owned, guest houses usually
located in historic haciendas or otherwise relevant buildings
or sites) joined the opposition to the development of Bahia
8 Scoping meetings are held to determine the scope of the
impact assessment to be conducted.
9 "Nosotros no necesitabamos una DIA para saber que era una
mala idea. Si nosotros hubieramos sabido del proyecto original nos
hubieramos opuesto entonces." (Santana Ronda, Interview, 1990)
Ballena, denouncing the government's lack of support to small,
locally-owned tourist facilities. (El Reportero, February 3,
1987) Meanwhile the governor and the Planning Board continued
defending the project. Before the EIS-Supplement was
completed, the DNR, under a new Secretary (Mr. Justo Mendez,
prominent ex-Senator and a powerful leader in Hern~ndez
Col6n's party) changed its public position and supported the
development plans. (El Reportero, January 24, 1987) In April,
Santana Ronda and others CPRG members met with Tourist
Development Office executives to discuss their concerns. The
EIS Supplement was made public on March 21, 1987.
The Public Hearing
The public hearing was held at Guhnica's Town Hall on May
18. By 10:00 on that Monday morning, the Town Hall was packed
and the hearing lasted all day. The Planning Board's Ms.
Gloria Soto, Esq., chaired the hearing. Following standard
format, first to speak was Architect Kenneth Niddrie,
representing Ballena Development Corporation. Mr. Niddrie
described the project, discussed the EIS-Supplement findings
and analyses, and then answered questions from the Hearing
Officers, but not from the public. 10
10 This section describing the public hearings is based on the
EQB's audio-taped record. To be as uninstrusive as possible I chose
to identify the source tape only when I quote directly one of the
speakers. The audio-tapes are listed in the Documents section of
Appendix I, Sources.
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After Mr. Niddrie's turn, Ms. Soto asked government
agency representatives to step forward and address the
hearing. There were representatives of nine government
agencies and offices, including Mr. Fernando GuzmAn, EQB
Environmental Assessment Director. Five of them took turns
after Mr. Niddrie; the EQB's Mr. Guzm~n did not. Miguel
Domenech, Executive Director, Office of Tourist Development,
favored the development on economic grounds, arguing that Club
Med would have significant economic impacts and make possible
the expansion of Ponce's Mercedita airport. Robert Pace of the
U.S. FWS called the EIS-Supplement "one of the best we have
reviewed."" After which he criticized its treatment of sand-
dune vegetation and other assorted items, and compared EISs to
promises during political campaigns, expressing concern over
how to make the developers comply with their mitigation
promises. Eugenio Barnes of the Instituto de Cultura
Puertorriqueho (Puerto Rico Institute of Culture) Juan Molina,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Jose Saliva, ARPE, also
spoke.
After breaking for lunch, the members of the assembled
public were allowed to address the hearing. First to speak
were those in favor of the development. Eight individuals,
most of whom identified themselves as professionals or
11 Bahia Ballena Public Hearing Audio-recordings, Documents,
May 18, 1987, audio tape #2.
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businessmen, took turns to endorse the development mostly on
economic grounds. Continued public access to the beach,
implementation of mitigation alternatives, a commitment to
hire Gudnica residents, the possible preferential treatment to
domestic products such as Puerto Rican beer, that nude-bathing
would not be allowed, and a commitment to not build a new
access road across the forest were all brought out as
conditions to their endorsement of the project.
Mr. Ernesto Almodobar Morciglidi was the first to speak
against the project. He questioned the government' s commitment
to the a fair hearing of the evidence and criticized
government representatives that had skipped the afternoon
after being there in the morning. The tone for the rest of
afternoon was set when he and Ms. Soto entered into a shouting
match over his use of not very pleasant, albeit not obscene,
adjectives to describe the motives and intentions of
government officials and developers.
Dr. Juan L.R. Ricard, Professor of Biology at the
Catholic University, Ponce, and member of the Comit6 Inter-
Universitario para Asuntos Ambientales (Inter-University
Committee on Environmental Affairs) critiqued at length and in
detail the scientific soundness of the document and questioned
the qualifications of some EIS team members. Among the issues
raised by him were: impact of "clean" effluent used for
irrigation on the flora and on the Tartaneja Lagoon; impact of
insecticides on the food chain; and the increased probability
of fires given increased traffic on Route 333. Professor
Migdalia Alvarez Cruz, University of Puerto Rico, Ponce,
speaking as a member of Caminantes Por la Paz (Marchers for
Peace) criticized the EIS-preparers' attitude towards nature
evident in their calling the mangrove-forest growth an
"aggression" to the Tartaneja Lagoon and plans to "save" the
lagoon from such "aggression." Professor Alvarez Cruz also
raised the issue of discharged treated water, some 160,000
gallons per day, pointing out that discharging to the lagoon
would threaten life there. She also pointed out that
discharging the treated water otherwise, and plans to use
irrigation could transform the ecosystem from that of a dry
subtropical forest to a pluvial one.
Dr. Neftali Garcia, Director, Servicios Cientificos y
T6cnicos (Scientific and Technical Services) questioned the
traffic analysis, and the lack of data to support statements
as to the capacity of Gudnica water wells to supply the
resort. Dr. Garcia also criticized the document conception as
a Supplement since the project was different from the one
analyzed in the 1976 EIS. He questioned the economic
projections in the EIS, and made various comparisons to other
EISs and tourist developments. During this part of his
presentation he was repeatedly interrupted by Ms. Soto who
questioned the relevance of other cases to the one before her;
the loudest shouting match of the afternoon ensued. After Dr.
Garcia's intervention, Ms. Soto became increasingly intolerant
to repetition and entered into shouting matches with various
citizens, one of them, Mr. Ernesto Almodobar Santiago, walked
out saying to Ms. Soto "You can't put a plug in my mouth. If
you want to talk bring your own presentation and you speak,
you don't want hear what I have to say."12
Project opponents continued to question the process, the
EIS document, and the hearing itself. Over Ms. Soto's
objections to repetition, they repeatedly questioned the
government's commitment to a fair hearing and public input
process given the support expressed by the governor and the
Planning Board before the Supplement was prepared. Specifics
of the EIS-Supplement were also questioned by members of the
public without technical training, specifically the statements
as to the Water and Sewage Authority's ability to supply water
to the project without further infrastructure improvements.
Many of them pointed out that their water is regularly shut-
off four and five days a week for up to six hours at a time.
Twelve days after the hearing, on May 30, the press reported
government plans to approve all necessary permits within
12 "Usted no me puede poner un tap6n en la boca. Si usted
quiere hablar traiga la ponencia y hable usted, usted no quiere oir
lo que yo tengo que decir. " Bahia Ballena Public Hearing Audio-
recordings, Documents, May 18, 1987, audio-tape #4.
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thirty days, to break ground within ninety days, and to
complete the project within twenty-four months. (El Reportero,
May, 30, 1987)
On June 11, Mr. Santos Rohena Betancourt, EQB President,
submitted the EQB' s written comments to the Planning Board. In
the letter, Rohena Betancourt raised nine issues: (1)
requested further study of the area' s flora, calling the EIS' s
analysis of the area's flora "shallow and/or not sufficiently
substantiated with scientific data";1 3 (2) requested a
listing of vertebrate fauna in the area and further study of
the impacts over them; (3) pointing out that the Water and
Sewage Authority had informed the EQB that the developers had
not approached the Authority in regards to the existing wells
capacity to supply the project, requested analysis of impacts
on the existing wells; (4) requested soil percolation analyses
and study of the impacts of irrigation on the existing
vegetation; (5) requested a more detailed analysis of the
impact of piers and other activities that would require
dredging, and of impacts on wetlands; (6) requested a more in-
depth analysis of the impact of insecticides on the food
chain; (7) requested further data on the impact of increased
traffic on Route 333 and the impact on the forest of widening
13 "Consideramos que se deben realizar estudios abarcadores y
especificos a la flora del area propuesta. Los presentados son poco
profundos y/o sustentados con datos cientificos." Rohena
Betancourt, Documents, June 11, 1987.
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the road; (8) requested measures to avoid or control flooding;
and (9) pointed out that the schematic plan presented at the
public hearings differed from that in the EIS and requested
that the impacts of these changes be discussed. The letter
asks the Planning Board to refrain from making a decision
until the EQB's questions are answered. (Rohena Betancourt,
Documents, June 11, 1987)
DNR Secretary Justo Mendez submitted his Department's
written comments directly to Mr. Niddrie in a letter dated
June 19, 1987. The DNR's letter was limited to requesting
studies of the hawksbill turtle nesting habits, to determine
the location of the sapo concho population, the exotic
Bulbostylis curassavica, and the guabairo's habitat, and
further analyses of Route 333 flood control capacity. Contrary
to the EQB's position, the DNR letter states that the studies
could be completed simultaneously with further Planning Board
deliberations and decision-making, but before preparing
construction plans. (Mendez, Documents, June 19, 1987)
The nine issues raised by the EQB in a three page letter
were dispatched in a two-page letter, dated June 22, 1987, and
signed by Mr. L6pez Atienza, Director of the Planning Board's
physical planning division. The need for further studies
regarding flora and fauna, and the study of flood control
capacity of Route 333, the letter states, echoing the DNR and
contradicting the EQB' s request, could be addressed during
subsequent stages simultaneously with the decision-making
process. The Planning Board did not address the request for
further study of insecticides and sewage effluent impacts.
Contradicting Mr. Niddrie's statements during the public
hearings, and straining belief, the Planning Board's letter
states that there would not be a need to move earth. Without
substantiating data, the Planning Board states that traffic
impacts on Route 333 will not require widening the road. And
also without substantiating data, in regards to water wells'
capacity the letter states:
"The existing wells appear to have the capacity to
satisfy the expected demand. However, if there is
not the capacity to supply the existing and
projected demand, it will have to be supplied by
carrier tanks. "14
The government was ready to move on, not knowing whether there
was enough water to supply the project and willing to haul it
from as far away as necessary.
The next day, EQB President Rohena Betancourt changed his
mind. In a letter dated June 23, 1987, he agrees with Justo
Mendez, the powerful DNR Secretary, and informs the Planning
14 "Los pozos existentes aparentan tener la capacidad para
suplir la demanda esperada. No obstante lo anterior, de no existir
capacidad para suplir la demanda existente y proyectada tendra que
proveerse la misma mediante tanques de acarreo." (L6pez Atienza,
Documents, 1987)
Board President that the EQB considers the Planning Board in
compliance with Ley 9, and that the decision-making process
does not need to be held until the previously requested
information is gathered. (Rohena Betancourt, Documents, June
23, 1987)
On its July 6 meeting, less than the required thirty days
after "answering" EQB' s letter and thus completing the EIS
process, the Planning Board approved the development project
(the official Resolution date is June 9). The Planning Board
imposed fifteen separate conditions on the developers to be
complied with simultaneously with further decision-making,
among them: to conduct archeological and habitat
identification studies; prohibited the alteration of wetlands
and the use of insecticides; established guidelines for
illumination; stated that Route 333 could not be widened;
required that a water tank be built with capacity to supply
the development with water for two days; required continued
public access to the beach but did not require Club Med to
provide parking; established conditions to safeguard the sand
dunes vegetation.15
is Puerto Rico Planning Board, Resoluci6n, Consulta Num. 86-59-
1025 JPU, Primera Extension al Informe Num. 86-59-JPU-1293, June 9,
1987.
THE COMMUNITY KEEPS THE PRESSURE ON
The CPRG, environmentalists and the bulk of the
scientific community remained opposed to the project. On
August 10 the CPRG submitted to the Planning Board a Petition
for Administrative Reconsideration. At the same time, thinking
that the Planning Board would deny their petition to
reconsider, the CPRG began preparations for civil action and
intensified its activist, political campaign.
The coalition by now included many of GuAnica's and
nearby towns' churches, fishermen associations from as far as
Vieques (an island-municipality off Puerto Rico' s East coast),
national environmental groups like Misi6n Industrial
(Industrial Mission, which had joined the coalition and
provided organizing and staff support since the early going)
and the Puerto Rican Conservation Foundation, peace groups,
high school and college students organizations, and leftists
political parties as well as nationally prominent politicians
from all major political parties. On July 25, nineteen days
after the Planning Board approved the Siting Consultation,
over 1,500 people marched in Gubnica against Club Med. During
the summer the CPRG organized walks to the forest, went to
radio talk shows, and met with, in the words of Santana Ronda,
"whoever was willing to meet with us."1'
On August 18, the CPRG, in collaboration with Misi6n
Industrial, made public an alternative plan for tourist
development. (CPRG, Documents, August 18, 1987) Among other
things the plan calls for the government to purchase the Moore
property to expand the forest and for increased investment in
the forest's research, popular education and recreation
infrastructure. Frenzied organizing and campaigning continued.
Beach clean-ups and prayer meetings were held in Gudnica.
Canals Mora, CPRG members, Misi6n Industrial staff, and others
were busy visiting and speaking at public schools, radio talk
shows, universities, and community centers all over Puerto
Rico. On December 21 the CPRG picketed La Fortaleza, the
governor's official residence.
In its meeting of November 25, 1987, the Planning Board
denied the Petition for Administrative Reconsideration. On
December 23 the CPRG submitted a Petition for Administrative
Revision at the Ponce Tribunal of Puerto Rico's Superior Court
(Pedro Santana Ronda y Salvador Mejill Lozada vs. Junta de
Planificaci6n del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, Civil
Num. CS 87-2713). Almost two years later, on July 7, 1989
Superior Court Judge Felipe Ortiz Ortiz, based on the
16 "Nos reuniamos con todo el que se querla reunir con
nosotros. " Santana Ronda, Interview, 1990.
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administrative record and the initial arguments, without
conducting a trial found: the EQB's role to have been limited
and not up to that required by the law; the Planning Board to
have made a decision in favor of the action without first
having considered in good faith the environmental impacts as
required by law; that a Preliminary EIS was required, not an
EIS-Supplement; that the EIS-Supplement did not present or
considered alternative actions as required; that the Planning
Board did not fulfill its monitoring and supervisory role over
the preparation of the EIS allowing it to become a promotional
instrument, and concluded:
"It is not the function of this Tribunal to
substitute the agency's judgement, nor is it to
discuss how correct or incorrect are the studies
and recommendations made by the different agencies.
However, we can weight matters and determine if the
Planning Board made a decision after having
considered environmental factors fully and in good
faith."
"Based on reasonability criteria it is inevitable
to conclude that Article 4(C) of the law in
question, the Regulations and the Guides for EIS
preparation were not strictly complied with."17
17 "No es funci6n de este Tribunal sustituir el criterio de la
agencia por el suyo, ni entrar a discutir la correcci6n o
incorrecci6n de los estudios y recomendaciones hechas por las
distintas agencias. Sin embargo, si podemos hacer un balance y
determinar si la Junta de Planificaci6n tom6 su decisi6n despues de
haber considerado por completo y de buena fe los factores
ambientales." "A base de los criterios de razonabilidad es forzoso
concluir que no se cumpli6 a cabalidad con lo dispuesto en el Art.
4(C) de la ley que nos ocupa, el Reglamento y las Guias para la
preparaci6n de las DIA' s. " Pedro Santana Ronda y Salvador Mejill
Lozada vs. Junta de Planificaci6n del Estado Libre Asociado de
Puerto Rico, Civil Num. CS 87-2713, Tribunal Superior de Puerto
Rico, Sala de Ponce (Civil No. CS87-2713, Superior Court of Puerto
Rico, Ponce Tribunal), July 7, 1989, p. 32.
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The Planning Board and Ballena Development appealed the
decision. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court dismissed the appeal
on January 18, 1990.
In its May 31, 1990 meeting, the Planning Board approved
a resolution requesting a Preliminary EIS for the project. The
resolution also suspended all transactions on the matter for
120 days, time to be used by Ballena Development Corporation
to prepare and submit the requested Preliminary EIS.
During an interview on August 24, 1990, Mr. Niddrie told
me that they were pursuing the project and planning to request
an extension to the 120 day time-line. However, Mr. Moore,
property owner, was conducting negotiations to sell the
property to a partnership formed by the CPRG and the Puerto
Rican Conservation Foundation. They had raised or obtained
commitments for a quarter of a million dollars towards the
purchase. The negotiations were suspended when, in late fall
1990, the government of Puerto Rico announced its intention to
buy the property. Negotiations between Mr. Moore and the
Puerto Rican Conservation Trust (the government agency
negotiating the purchase) are said to be going well with a
purchase agreement expected later this year. The community
groups have not been consulted about, or kept informed by the
government on the progress of the negotiations to purchase the
property. (Vera, Interview, 1991)
To summarize: Private plans to develop Bahia Ballena,
supported by government agencies, were initiated in the early
1970s but were kept secret until 1986. When the plans became
public, the local community, the scientific community, and
environmentalists immediately reacted organizing a national
campaign against it. Faced with this opposition, the central
government circled the wagons and systematically attempted to
repress opposition to the project within and outside
government agencies. Key in this strategy was the government's
attempt to circumvent Ley 9, by denying both the need for
public hearings on the matter, and the need for a new EIS.
When well organized, grassroots opposition to the
project, working outside the official EIS framework, made the
central government's position politically untenable, a pro
forma EIS and public hearings process was organized by the
Planning Board. The community participated in the official EIS
process in order to denounce it, not believing that they could
make much of a difference on the final decision; but building
their case for civil action in the courts. Unable to influence
the government's decision through official EIS channels,
through the courts the community was able to stop the project
by forcing the central government into complying with Ley 9
and the requirements of the EIS Regulations. The increased and
increasing financial costs to investors, and political costs
to the party in power became too high to be a wise political
or financial investment. Only then did the government retract
its position and is now attempting to buy and set aside for
preservation the Bahia Ballena property.
The government's lack of commitment to public
participation remains evident in their not even having
attempted to consult with the community or to keep the public
informed about the purchase. The one lesson that the
government appears to have learned is that EIS requirements
for citizen involvement are not in keeping with the
authoritarian political culture. Thus, faced with the
alternative of swallowing hard and accommodating citizens'
demands for a voice in environmental policy-making, powerfull
sectors in the state choose to further minimize the limited
power of disgruntled citizens. In the following chapter I
discuss changes to the EIS Regulations aimed at accomplishing
this.
AMENDING THE EIS REGULATIONS
Attempts to amend the EIS Regulations date back to 1986.1
During March 1986, the EQB held a two day workshop on EIS
Regulations at a hotel in San Juan. The workshop was attended
by representatives of government agencies, private industry,
environmentalists, and other EIS experts. A document
containing the suggestions and issues raised during the
workshop served as the basis for drafting amendments to the
Regulations. Based on that document the EQB drafted a set of
amendments to the EIS Regulations and took them to public
hearing on February 11, 1987, three months before the Bahia
Ballena EIS went to public hearing in Gudnica. The amendments
were not adopted; the Planning Board's intervention is
considered by many to be the reason for this.
I This section reconstructing events leading to the amendments
to the EIS Regulations that went to public hearing in the spring of
1990 is based mostly on interviews that I conducted during a six
week research visit to Puerto Rico in August 1990 and a second
visit in January 1991. The section is not as extensively footnote
as earlier ones for two reasons: (1) It is a story I pieced
together from numerous interviews. It would be cumbersome,
distracting, and even impractical to reference all my sources. (2)
I was not able to obtain and revise many documents mentioned by my
sources. In this regard I was careful to not bring in documents and
events or impressions about the same that are not supported by a
preponderance of the interview data. If parts of the section seem
unclear, confusing or contradictory, it is a reflection of the
above -- maybe inevitable to a certain degree when researching
contemporary, dynamic, political events. The few documents that I
was able to obtain or review, and the Morales Cordero and Sarriera
RomAn written testimony to the April 4, 1990 Public Hearing, are
appropriately referenced when used as sources in this section.
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The issue of amending the EIS Regulations laid dormant
for almost a year (a year during most of which Bahia Ballena's
development was at the forefront of the public debate). On May
10, 1988, Ms. Patria Custodio, Planning Board President, sent
a letter to EQB President Rohena Betancourt informing him
that the Planning Board had prepared a draft amending the EIS
Regulations. (Morales Cordero and Sarriera RomAn, Documents,
April 4, 1990) On the 13th, through a second letter, Ms.
Custodio informed Mr. Rohena Betancourt that the private
sector, particularly the construction industry, wanted to
examine the EIS Regulations as part of their evaluation of the
EQB. (Morales Cordero and Sarriera Romin, Documents, April 4,
1990)
Mr. GermAn GonzAlez, Esq., was hired by the EQB to draft
amendments to the EIS Regulations. In drafting the amendments
he worked closely with Ms. Lina Dueflo of the Planning Board
who had on-going discussions with construction industry
executives on the issue. In a letter dated February 15, 1989,
Mr. GonzAlez informs EQB President Rohena Betancourt that
"Planning Board staff submitted written amendments to sections
3, 4 and 5 of the present draft." 2 Personnel of the EQB
Planning and EIS Divisions informed me that they did not
2 "Oficiales de la Junta de Planificaci6n propusieron por
escrito enmiendas a las secciones 3, 4 y 5 del actual borrador."
German Gonzalez, letter to JCA President Santos Rohena, February
15, 1989, quoted in Morales Cordero and Sarriera RomAn, Documents,
April 4, 1990.
participate in drafting the amendments and were first able to
review them only after they were made public. "It was all
handled by outside consultants, the office of the President,
and the Planning Board. "' Clearly Planning Board staff working
with Mr. GonzAlez in the amendments were actively consulting
construction industry interests but not community and
environmental groups, not even EQB staff. The new set of
amendments, according to various sources who have examined
both, were more permissive and pro-developer than the
amendments that went to public hearings in February 11, 1987.
When reviewing the above, it is fairly clear and
consistent with their roles in Bahia Ballena, that the EQB's
initial attempt to amend the EIS Regulations was tabled due to
pressures by the Planning Board. It is also clear that the
Board in turn was responding to pressures from the private
sector, in particular the construction industry. The "quiet"
period from 1987 to late 1989/early 1990 must have been a very
active one for the Planning Board and private development
interests, but we may never know for sure since documentation
is scant.
Puerto Rico's Law for Uniform Administrative Procedures
(Law No. 170 of August 12, 1988) requires all agencies to have
3 "Todo eso lo bregaron consultores, la Oficina del
Presidente, y la Junta de Planificaci6n." EQB Anonymous Staffer,
Interview, 1990.
an official file on regulations in effect and under
consideration. The file should contain all petitions,
memoranda and other written materials used by the agency when
considering adopting or amending regulations. This information
was not available to reviewers before the amendments went to
public hearing, " ... the present proposal happens in a total
information vacuum since 1987 (when the Planning Boards
intervenes) . Again, the Planning Board conducts its policy
definition process in a secretive manner, in this case even
kept secret from other government agencies. Amendments to
regulations aimed at informing public debate and promoting
citizen involvement in the state's policy-making process were
drafted without citizen involvement and away from public
scrutiny.
Environmentalists and community organizations reacted
indignantly to the proposed amendments. Instinctively,
environmentalists denounced the Planning Board as the master
mind behind the amendments, which was denied by Planning Board
executives. Meanwhile, spokesmen for private developers hailed
the amendments. Porfirio Brito, President of the Asociaci6n de
Constructores de Hogares (Association of Home Builders):
"There are a number of projects in which an EIS is
4 "Entendemos que la actual propuesta se da en un total vaclo
de informaci6n. " (Morales Cordero and Sarriera Roman, Documents,
1990, p.5)
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not really needed because of their small size as is
the development of one hundred homes. "5
Environmentalist Pedro Saade Llorens:
"Developers and the private industry have pressured
proponent agencies like the Planning Board to limit
the scope of the law and to make the EIS a brief
document and accelerate the approval process. ...
The result is an incomplete and superficial
document with limited information that, because of
a lack of appropriate criteria, will negatively
affect government decisions ."6
Once again environmentalists and community groups on one
side, and the EQB, the Planning Board, and private development
interests on the other side readied themselves to battle in
the public hearing (April 4, 1990). In the Bahia Ballena case
federal environmental organizations, like the Army Corps of
Engineers and the FWS, supported the project but not as
wholeheartedly as did the Planning Board. In the matter of the
amendments, however, federal environmental agencies in Puerto
Rico (not under the governor's control and thus capable of
exercising greater autonomy) denounced the amendments as
wholeheartedly as did local community and environmental
I "Existe una serie the proyectos en que en realidad no se
requiere una DIA por lo pequenos que son como un desarrollo de 100
viviendas." From: "Objeci6n Ambientalista a los Planes de la JCA,"
El Nuevo Dia, MISSING: DATE AND PAGE.
6 "Los desarrolladores y la empresa privada presionan a
agencias proponentes como la Junta de Planificaci6n para que se
omita la amplitud de la ley y para que la DIA sea un documento mds
breve y acelere el proceso de aprobaci6n. ... Lo que surge es un
documento incompleto y superficial con informaci6n limitada que
afectar~n las decisiones gubernamentales por la falta de
criterios. " Ibid.
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groups.
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
The proposed amendments to the EIS Regulations, according
to the EQB and the Planning Board, seek to expedite the EIS
process. This is not counter to the EQB's institutional
mission, but an analysis of proposal suggests different
motives. The amendments would have changed virtually every
section of the regulations, but it would not be practical for
me to discuss all of them in detail. A well chosen sample will
suffice.
For the sake of clarity, the following section has a
special format: First comes a single-spaced paragraph. In bold
is the regulation number followed by the section title
(underlined) when applicable. The paragraph describes the
substance of the proposed change in as objective a language as
possible. This first single-spaced paragraph is followed by
double-spaced text presenting: my analysis and interpretation
of the amendment's possible impact on the EIS process and
public participation; the effect the amendment would have had
on the Ballena EIS process; and the possible intent of the EQB
and the Planning Board in making such amendment.
Section 1.2. Public Policy. This section is a re-statement of
the policy goals and objectives of Ley 9, it is considered
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repetitive and thus eliminated by the amendments.
The Regulations are usually the only document that
developers and the public use as a guide to the goals,
objectives, and requirements of the law. Doing away with the
statement of goals and objectives would greatly limit the
public's and the developers' understanding of the intent of
the law. The importance of this section as is, is to provide
an orientation as to the intention of the law: to create a
planning mechanism that brings environmental considerations
into the public policy decision-making process so that valued
environmental components are preserved and/or impacts
minimized, and to accomplish this through an open process that
involves the citizens.
Including this section in the Regulations makes the
document a more complete and comprehensive one. And, as
Morales Cordero and Sarriera RomAn point out, Sections 1.2.d.,
e., and g. go beyond the law's requirements. (Morales Cordero
and Sarriera RomAn, Documents, April 4, 1990) Sections 1.2.d.,
and e. establish guidelines for the interpretation of the law
and the Regulations. Section 1.2.e. (1) require agencies to
interpret and analyze their statutory authority in accordance
with the regulations. Section 1.2.g. calls upon the proponent
to: "Stimulate and facilitate public involvement in the
decisions that affect the environmental quality of the human
environment."
By changing this section, the EQB limits the ability of
the public to understand and, therefore, participate fully in
the process. It also provides a loophole for developers and
EIS preparers, who may interpret the regulations and the law
in a way that favors their interests, and frame the EIS
process in such a way as to limit public involvement to the
minimum possible .
Section 2. Definitions.
2.1.a. Action. The section's language defining a government
"action" that requires preparing an EIS is changed from
specific to general.
The existing Regulations provide an illustrative, non-
exhaustive list of what constitutes a government "action." In
the amendments the list is stricken and substituted for the
term "that have a significant environmental impact." Morales
Cordero and Sarriera Romdn argue that the logic of the new
language is the opposite of the law's intent: the study of
potential environmental impacts of proposed actions in order
to determine the significance of the impacts.
". . . [under the new language] it could be argued
that a project is not an action because it does not
cause significant environmental impacts, in which
case the law could not applied to the process of
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determining whether there is an impact or not. " 7
The room for argument that this change would provide, and
changes to the definition of an Environmental Assessment
(Section 3., discussed below) threaten to make the EIS
process, in practice, a discretionary, almost voluntary
process.
2.1.c. Addendum. 2.1.i. (2.1.j. in the amended version)
Preliminary Environmental Impact Statement. 2.1.J. (2.1.k. in
the amended version) Final Environmental Impact Statement.
2.1.k. (2.1.1. in the amended version) Determination of No
Significant Environmental Impact. Language changes from
"prepared by the proposing agency" to "prepared under the
responsibility of the proposing agency."(Emphasis added.)"
The amendments allow for the EIS and addenda to it, and
for the D-N to be prepared by private developers instead of
the proponent government agency. In practice, in Puerto Rico
and elsewhere, EISs are prepared by technical teams hired,
7 "Existe el peligro de que se pueda alegar que un proyecto no
es acci6n por no causar impacto ambiental significativo, en cuyo
caso no aplicarla la Ley al proceso de determinaci6n sobre si
existe el impacto o no. (Morales Cordero and Sarriera RomAn,
Documents, April 4, 1990, p. 20)
8 The original is from the English version of the regulations.
The amended version my translation from the Spanish EIS draft
amendments. In Spanish the original four separate sections are
written in two different ways but with identical meaning; one
variation, in the active voice, is: ". . .que prepararA la agencia
... "; the other, in the passive voice, is: "... que serA preparado
por la agencia .. . " The amended versions are identical: " ... que
ser& preparado bajo la responsabilidad de la agencia ... " Enmiendas
a los Reglamentos DIA, Puerto Rico Environmental Quality Board,
1990, Sections, 2.1.c., 2.1.j., 2.1.k., and 2.1.1.
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supervised, and paid by the developers (as was the case in
Bahia Ballena) and such practice has been validated by the
courts. 9 The EIS Guides also endorse this practice. 10 But
when a private corporation initiates the action or proposal
that causes a government decision or action and thus triggers
the process .1 ... while the proponent agency may accept the
collaboration of the interested party ... it must exercise an
active monitoring function in the preparation ... " of the
EIS. 1" And the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 1506.5
(1988), require the proponent agency to choose the person
preparing the EIS and to obtain a statement from him/her to
the effect that s/he has no financial interest in the project
under study. The intent being to:
". ... minimize the conflict of interest inherent in
the situation of those outside the government
9 For federal cases see: Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F. 2d 43, 59
(1974); Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487
F. 2d 849, 851 (1973); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F. 2d 460,
467 (1973); and Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F. 2d 957, 963 (5th
Circuit 1983). In the Bahia Ballena case (Pedro Santana Ronda y
Salvador Mejill Lozada v. Junta de Planificaci6n de Puerto Rico,
Civil No. CS87-2713, Superior Court of Puerto Rico, Ponce Tribunal,
July 7, 1989) the practice was also sanctioned by the court.
10 Manual para la preparaci6n, evaluaci6n y uso de las
declaraciones de impacto ambiental, Executive Order No. 1666 of
June 30, 1971, Section 11.A.
1 "Sin embargo, en casos como el presente, donde es una
corporaci6n privada la que estA solicitando el permiso de
ubicaci6n, la agencia proponente aunque puede aceptar la
colaboraci6n de la parte interesada en la otorgaci6n del permiso,
debe ejercer una funci6n fiscalizadora y activa en la preparaci6n
y aprobaci6n de la DIA. " Pedro Santana Ronda and Salvador Mejill
Lozada vs. Junta de Planificaci6n del Estado Libre Asociado de
Puerto Rico, Civil No. CS87-2713, Superior Court of Puerto Rico,
Ponce Tribunal, July 7, 1989, p.27.
coming to the government for money, leases or
permits while attempting impartially to analyze the
environmental consequences of their getting it."12
The change in language makes the proposing agency less
accountable for the process and content of the EIS. The EIS is
put practically completely in the hands of those with the
clearest financial interest in getting the project approved.
However, some who support this change, like Mr. Carlos Gimenez
Barber, EQB President from 1972 to 1976, argue that the
private developers' control of the process under the present
language is such that further language changes can not have a
noticeable impact. (Gimenez Barber, Interview, 1991)
In the Bahia Ballena case the court endorsed the use of
private parties to prepare the EIS but chastised the Planning
Board for abdicating its monitoring function. In his sentence,
Judge Felipe Ortiz Ortiz stated:
"We want to point out that one of the consequences
of completely delegating the preparation of the EIS
is that it be used by the developers to promote
their interests."
"In this case in particular, not even the
requirement of submitting the EIS in the name of
the agency and its officer with responsibility for
the project was complied with. ... "
"In reading the Supplement we see how it was used
12 Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 963 (5th Circuit 1983).
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to propagandize the proposed project."13
The proposed amendment, if approved, would threaten to make
this promotional practice a much more common occurrence.
Section 2.1.r. Guides for the Preparation of Environmental
Impact Statements. The section is deleted; all subsequent
references to the Guides are also deleted.
By taking the Guides (Manual para la preparaci6n,
evaluaci6n y uso de las declaraciones de impacto ambiental,
Executive Order No. 1666 of June 30, 1971) out of the
Regulations their legal weight is diminished, and their
existence may not come to the attention of EIS preparers and
reviewers. Mr. Miguel Canals Mora and various other
professionals routinely involved in EIS processes used the
term "environmental mercenaries" referring to a group of
scientists who sell their professional services to developers
in need of EISs and do whatever it takes to prove that
proposed projects do not have negative impacts on the
environment. Their ability to manipulate data in such way,
13 "Deseamos sefalar que una de las consecuencias que conlleva
el delegar por completo la redacci6n de la DIA es el que esta se
utilice por parte del proyectista para promover sus intereses. " "En
este caso en particular, ni siquiera se cumpli6 con el requisito de
presentar la DIA a nombre de la agencia y un funcionario de esta
como responsable por el proyecto. ... " "A traves de la lectura del
Suplemento vemos c6mo se utiliz6 el mismo para hacerle propaganda
al proyecto propuesto." Pedro Santana Ronda y Salvador Mejill
Lozada vs. Junta de Planificaci6n de Puerto Rico, Civil No. CS87-
2713, Superior Court of Puerto Rico, Ponce Tribunal, July 7, 1989,
pp. 28-29.
however, is constrained, among other things by the existence
and enforceability of the Guides. If the Guides do not have
regulatory weight and the EISs are put completely in the hands
of developers, these "environmental mercenaries" will have a
free hand to do as they please. The EISs would be even more
deficient than they have been historically.
2.1.t. (2.1.u. in the amended version) Environmental Impact.
2.1.u. (2.1.v. of the amended version) Significant
Environmental Impact. These sections' language is changed from
specific to generic.
Language changes omit "secondary and/or cumulative
impacts" from the definition, and omit the sections'
illustrative, non-exhaustive list of examples of the
environmental components over which impacts occur. Thus the
amended Regulations trade specificity for generalities that
are up to interpretation, and make discretionary the selection
of environmental components to be studied. This only
reinforces the developers control of the process by taking
norms and standards out of the process. It is a scary
proposition to think of the "environmental mercenaries"
mentioned above, supervised only by developers, without
guidelines for the preparation of EISs, deciding and
interpreting on their own what secondary and cumulative
impacts are.
Up until now, by only reviewing the amendments proposed
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to definitions, a fairly clear picture of the EIS process
under an amended set of regulations is emerging. A very bleak
picture it is indeed. Without addressing the procedural
requirements, the EQB and the Planning Board have been able to
transform it into a discretionary, almost voluntary process,
without norms and standards, and controlled by developers. Was
their intention to do away with Ley 9 without taking it out
off the books?
Section 3. Environmental Assessment.
3.1.1. The amendments redefine the EA and its purpose from a
process to determine whether significant impacts exist into a
final document aimed at identifying mitigation alternatives.
This change from an assessment to a mitigation tool is
illogical: It must first be determined that significant
impacts do in fact exist before mitigation alternatives are
identified and chosen. (I discuss further implications of this
proposed change below.)
3.4. Processing Requirements.
3.4.3 The whole section is re-written; the EQB loses its power
to require an EIS after reviewing the EA through an Order to
Do. 3.4.4. The whole section is re-written; the EQB loses its
power to impose "reasonable and necessary" conditions non-
compliance with which may be reason for the EQB to deny
permits before the EQB. 3.4.8 The whole section is re-written;
the EQB loses its power to determine whether the content of an
EA is adequate in terms of compliance with Ley 9.
Not only are the EAs turned into mitigation tools, but
the EQB's review of them is made inconsequential with the
amendments to this section. With the preparation of EAs under
almost total control of the developers as discussed earlier
plus making the EA a mitigation tool, the EQB's lose of power
contained in the amendments to these sections can only be
qualified as a the EQB's abdication of its role as guardian of
the environment. Why have an Environmental Quality Board when
it is not able to fulfill its institutional mission?
The amendments to these sections serve to shed light on
the origin of the amendments. What government agency willingly
amends its own regulations in a way that the agency comes out
less powerful in relation to other agencies? The cumulative
effect of the proposed amendments, discussed so far, make it
increasingly difficult to believe the Planning Board's public
statement denying being the originator of the amendments.
Section 4. Procedure for the Determination of No Significant
Environmental Impact.
4.2.1. The whole section is re-written; from requiring the
document to contain an explanation of why there will not be
significant impacts the amendment calls for a document that
explains "under which conditions the proposed action will not
have a significant impact."'4
14 "La DN deberA ser en espafiol y contener una descripci6n de
la acci6n o proyecto y un analisis ambiental que permita bajo que
condiciones la acci6n propuesta no va a tener impacto
significativo. " Enmiendas a los Reglamentos DIA, Puerto Rico
Environmental Quality Board, 1990, Section 4.2.1.
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This amendment shows clearly the intent in changing the
EA to a mitigation-identification document. Under the existing
regulations, a D-N is used to explain why certain action will
not have significant impacts, mitigation measures are not
required since there will not be a significant impact. With
the EA as a tool to identify and choose mitigation
alternatives, projects that might have otherwise required an
EIS can be taken care of with a D-N since the mitigation
strategies (identified before it is determined that impacts do
exist according to the inverse logic of the amendment to
Section 3.1.1.) will do away with the impacts. The EIS could
become an endangered species.
4.3.1. The whole section is re-written; the regulations in
effect declare the D-N a public document available for review
by all interested parties, the amended version would require
that the document be submitted only to the EQB and other
agencies the "proponent agency considers pertinent."15 4.3.2.
The whole section is re-written; the amended version does not
provide for the proponent agency to extend the thirty day
period for written comments as does the version in effect.
Had these amendments been in effect during the Bahia
Ballena case, not only would have an EA resulting in a D-N
been possible, but the public would not have been notified
about it since a public notice would not have been required.
The D-N would not have been easily accessible, and the
Planning Board could have denied requests to extend the
15 "La DN sera sometida a la Junta y a cualquier otra entidad
que la agencia proponente estime pertinente." Ibid. Section 4.3.1.
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thirty-day time line for comments.
Section 5. Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure.
5.2.1. The whole section is re-written; the current version
describes the instances when an EIS is needed. The amendments
transform this section from a comprehensive and detailed
description, including an illustrative, non-exhaustive list of
actions with subsections from a. to g., to one generic
sentence. 5.2.3. The section is omitted in the amendments; the
existing regulations empower the EQB to require an EIS for any
action or project that according to its judgment may have
significant impacts.
5.3.5. and 5.3.6. The proposed amendments change specific
language addressing what is to be included in an EIS and the
substance of the discussion of impacts for general provisions
open to interpretation. The new, generic content requirements
are couched by "if necessary" clauses.
Again, specific and detailed information and guides are
substituted with generalities up to interpretation further
eroding the EQB's power over the process. On the other hand,
the power of private parties is enhanced by allowing them to
determine when something is necessary. Had these amendments
been in effect during the Bahia Ballena EIS process, the
Planning Board and Ballena Development Corporation would have
been able to determine not only if an EIS was needed, but they
would have determined what to study and how to study it.
Section 7. Public Hearings
7.1. The amendments change "[comments made by the public]
shall be used in the preparation of the final EIS" to
"[comments made by the public] mih be used in the
preparation of the final EIS. " (Emphasis added. ) 16
The public's ability to influence the EIS and
decision-making processes is limited while the power of
private development interests is enhanced. If the proposed
amendments had been in effect at the time of the Ballena EIS
process the Planning Board and the developers, had they
decided to prepare an EIS, could have avoided addressing the
issues of turtle nesting, sapo concho and guabairo habitat
studies, flooding, and other issues raised during the public
comment process.
WRITTEN COMMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE EQB
Ms. Hilda Diaz Soltero of the U.S. FWS, commenting on the
proposed amendments:
". ... Only a few of them [EIS] ever comply with the
specifications established ... [the EIS
Regulations] do not need change they need
enforcement, not easement. ... "
"It is inconceivable that the Environmental Quality
Board ... proposes to eliminate the items required
for an environmental assessment. ... "
"These changes represent ... an act of injustice to
the already fragile environment of Puerto Rico."
(Diaz Soltero, Documents, 1990)
16 "Dichas vistas publicas podr~n celebrarse en cualquier
momento despues de la preparaci6n y emisi6n de la DIA Preliminar y
la informaci6n obtenida de las vistas /debera/ podr utilizarse en
la preparaci6n de la DIA final." (In | i is the original,
underlined is the proposed change.) Ibid., Section 7.1.
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The strong and direct language of Ms. Diaz Soltero contrasts
with the timid comments on the amendments of Mr. TomAs Rivera
of the EQB's Water Quality Division. (Rivera, Documents,
undated) Mr. Rivera uses verbs in the potential instead of the
indicative mode, and the tone of his letter is never close to
the indignant tone of Ms. Diaz Soltero. One would think that
they are not commenting on the same amendments or that they
value environmental quality very differently.
Mr. Pedro J. Rivera, Director, IDC Office for
Environmental Affairs, is as indignant as Ms. Diaz Soltero but
from the opposite perspective. (Rivera, Documents, 1990) Mr.
Rivera starts by arguing that the EIS is a planning process
not a regulatory one. But his implicit definition of planning
is a strange one to say the least. He opposes as a regulatory
strategy, not in tune with the planning nature of the law,
mitigation measures and other conditions required during the
process in order to later obtain pertinent and necessary
permits. According to him, the objective of the impact
assessment process is "... to show the industrialist' s
capacity and good faith to comply . . "7
Showing clearly to not understand, or to not care about,
17 "En la evaluaci6n del impacto ambiental lo importante es
demostrar la buena fe y la capacidad del industrial para cumplir
con los reglamentos y obtener los permisos que se le requieran."
(Rivera, Documents, 1990, p.2)
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the objectives of Ley 9: IDC's Mr. Pedro Rivera opposes the
EQB's ability to monitor and review all actions and decisions
by government agencies in order to determine if an EIS is
required, as well as the EQB's power to examine all D-Ns, and
suggests that the EQB should only review those that will
require an EQB license or permit. He also argues that "...
because each industrial project is unique and different ... "
the IDC should be allowed to devise its own system for
categorical exclusions. 1 8 In his letter, which is IDC's
official position, he even opposes requirements for informing
the public of the existence of environmental assessments.
Dr. Ariel Lugo, who worked with the Puerto Rico DNR
during its early years and served in President Carter's
Council on Environmental Quality, criticized the amendments
for not addressing what he considers the EIS process four
principal flaws: (1) the poor quality and lack of substantial
analysis in the EISs; (2) difficult to comprehend documents;
(3) the bureaucratization of the process, used as a
justification for the automatic approval of detrimental
projects; and (4) limited public involvement. Problems that in
his opinion are due to the developers being in charge of
preparing the EISs with little involvement by the responsible
18 nEl sistema de exclusiones categ6ricas no es adecuado ni
prActico para Fomento, debido a que cada proyecto industrial es
particular y diferente y que la tecnologia industrial y de control
ambiental cambia continuamente. " Ibid. p.5.
government agencies, the lack of follow-up and monitoring
mechanisms, and inappropriate means to inform the
public.(Lugo, Documents, 1990)
"In cases where I have been involved, some
government agencies have 'chosen' the least
effective vehicle to notify the interested public."
" .. . Unfortunately, the tendency has been to HIDE
from citizens proposals for the use of public
resources and the environment."(Emphasis in
original) 19
In his letter, Dr. Lugo suggests that a public fund be created
with contributions by those individuals and organizations that
need to prepare an EIS, to be used by government agencies to
hire the teams of scientists that will prepare the EISs.
(Lugo, Documents, 1990)
CONCLUSION
In interviews with EQB staff members, they consistently
refused to comment for the record, some refused at all, on the
implications of the proposed amendments. This attitude, the
timid letter by the EQB's Mr. TomAs Rivera in response to the
proposed amendments, and the EQB's roles in the Bahia Ballena
19 The quote is my translation of: "En casos en que yo he
estado envuelto, algunas agencias han 'seleccionado' el vehiculo de
notificaci6n pd'blica menos efectivo para avisar al pn'blico
interesado. " "... Desgraciadamente la tendencia ha sido la de
ESCONDER de los ciudadanos las propuestas de uso de los recursos y
el ambiente pnblico. " (Lugo, Documents, 1990, p.2)
case and in the process of drafting the amendments, provide a
sharp contrast with the aggressive attitude of Ms. Diaz
Soltero in response to the amendments, the forward and
critical stance by Mr. Robert Pace during the Bahia Ballena
EIS process (both U.S. FWS staff), the Planning Board's role
in Bahia Ballena and in amending the Regulations, and the no-
holds-barred approach of Mr. Pedro Rivera of IDC. Clearly EQB
staff do not feel as empowered by their position in the
government hierarchy as do members of these other agencies.
The weak position of the EQB vis a vis other government
agencies, evident in both cases studied in this thesis, do not
allow the EQB to fulfill its institutional mission and
undercuts its staff's ability to advocate in behalf of the
agency and, thus, the environment. The proposed amendments to
the EIS Regulations represent the EQB's virtual surrender of
its unique role in the policy-making process. This is the
result of long-standing turf struggles with other government
agencies, like the Planning Board. From its inception, the EQB
has had to fight these agencies in order to assert its unique
role. The Planning Board, for example, has argued since the
EQB and EIS requirements were established, to be above Ley 9
because its mandate is an integrative one while the EQB's is
a sectoral one. In particular the Planning Board has refused
to prepare EISs when, without a particular project in mind, it
considers zoning changes. (Gimenez Barber, Interview, 1991)
In the Bahia Ballena case the principal ally, maybe the
only reliable one, that Ley 9 had was an organized and
actively involved community. When the amendments were
proposed, community groups also came to the rescue and played
a major role in defending the law and therefore the
environment. Thus, in my opinion, only through a citizen
empowerment strategy that goes beyond present participation
requirements can the lofty goals of Ley 9 be assured a fair
try. In the next chapter I make some suggestions and attempt
to outline a citizen-centered process to this effect.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The evidence collected through the case studies in this
research have validated the fundamental premise and hypotheses
of my thesis:
(1) That public participation in the formal EIS process in
Puerto Rico does not lead to public influence over public
policy decisions. Instead it is the public's ability and
willingness to go outside the formal process what allows for
a modicum of environmental protection.
This was clearly illustrated in the Bahia Ballena case
study. The decision made by the Planning Board was made
against the desires of a broad sector of Gu~nica residents who
in turn had ample support from other community and
environmental organizations throughout Puerto Rico. The
coalition was able to make the development of Bahia Ballena a
national issue through its activist political campaign outside
the formal EIS process. They used the formal EIS process
primarily as a political platform, an organizing tool, not
expecting their participation in it to effectively influence
the decision.
(2) That while the general public's ability to influence the
environmental policy-making process is limited despite their
active participation, social elites and pro-development
interests are able to influence policy-making with a minimum
of participation.
This was also evident in the Bahia Ballena case-study.
But even more so in the way that the proposed amendments to
the EIS Regulations were drafted. The draft amendments were
the result of behind-the-scenes maneuvering by the Planning
Board in close collaboration with construction industry
skates.
(3) The fragmented nature of the formal EIS and decision-
making process serve to isolate government decision-makers
from the public and from each other.
Again, this was manifested in both case studies. In the
Bahia Ballena case there are plenty of examples. For instance,
the DNR's long-standing opposition to the project and repeated
requests for an EIS were consistently and effectively denied
by the Planning Board. The Bahia Ballena case also served to
demonstrate how this fragmentation plays not only across
agencies but within agencies; for example, the DNR never
brought-up the proposed project to the Department's division
in charge of forest management. One last example of this
fragmentation from the Bahia Ballena case is the EQB not
having had to face the citizens in a public hearing because it
was "the Planning Board's project. "
Amending the EIS was not an instance of impact
assessment, but it serves to demonstrate another dimension of
this fragmentation and isolation. The amendments were drafted
by a consultant to the EQB, not by EQB staff, in fact, EQB
staff assigned to the EIS and planning divisions were not
involved in drafting the amendments.
(4) Public participation in the formal EIS process, while
efficient is not effective.
The efficiency of citizen involvement in the formal EIS
process was manifest in the Bahia Ballena case through their
identification of substantial environmental impacts and issues
otherwise overlooked. And in their ability to bring into the
process scientists and professionals that would not have been
involved otherwise. This participation would have been
effective if the public had been able to influence the process
through the official EIS mechanisms, which they were not able
to do.
In order to be effective, the community had to resort to
judicial mechanisms. In court they proved that the government
had not followed procedural requirements according to the
spirit and letter of the law. This, in itself, however, did
not bring about a change in policy. If the investors had had
the financial resources and the stomach to continue the fight,
it would still be raging-on. The policy was changed by default
when the property owner decided to sell to others with
preservation objectives instead of pursuing the property's
development.
The EIS process, as it was clear in the Bahia Ballena
case, has not been used as the planning tool it was designed
to be. In fact, as the analysis of the proposed amendments
showed, the Puerto Rican government has attempted to limit
this dimension of the law. Crucial to the planning tool
dimension of the law is its citizen involvement requirement.
In this regard, the government's "effort", in the case of
Bahia Ballena, falls somewhere between consultation (what a
public hearing theoretically attempts) and placation (the
reason for the public hearing) neither of which is a genuine
form of participation according to Arnstein's ladder.
(Arnstein, 1969) But the historically authoritarian state
seems unsatisfied with its substantial ability to manipulate
the process according to the existing legal framework, the
attempt to further curtail citizen participation through
amending the EIS Regulations is an indicator of this tendency.
The state's manipulation of participatory programs
(evident in both case studies) attempts to safeguard the
elites' interests at the expense of sound environmental
policy. Environmentally un-sound public policy decisions
reached through this authoritarian process, when not
implemented at the expense of the environment, can be blocked
by disgruntled communities through political-organizing and
judicial strategies. This can result in: (1) the state's
reversal of policy decisions, without in turn re-gaining the
trust of the community, in fact at the expense of whatever
trust there remains, as was the case in Bahia Ballena; and/or
(2) expensive delays and ill-conceived last-minute alterations
to badly needed development projects.
Another clear lesson from these case studies is that
environmental values are not institutionalized in the
functioning of Puerto Rico's government. This was evident in
the Planning Board's lax monitoring of the EIS-Supplement
being prepared by Ballena Development Corporation, not an
isolated instance according to most of my sources with
professional experience on the matter. The willingness to let
developers take further control over the process despite the
clear conflict of interests and the poor quality of the work
done by them so far, manifest in the proposed amendments to
the EIS Regulations, also serves to demonstrate that
environmental values are a long way from being an integral
part of the government's decision-making criteria.
One last issue affecting the integrity of the process and
the EQB's ability to pursue its institutional mission is the
governor's power over all the government agencies involved.
The governor names the presidents and other members of the EQB
and the Planning Board, and all the departments' secretaries.
Thus, they are all indebted to the lider dnico. And, as was
evident in the Bahia Ballena case, the governor has plenty of
incentives to put economic development objectives over and
above environmental protection ones and to use government
agencies to advance his program. Working within such a
structure, given the highly politicized character of Puerto
Rican society and the highly partisan nature of politics
there, the EQB can not help but yield to political pressures.
RZCONDATIONS
The easiest suggestion to make in attempting to address
the problems in the EIS process and public participation in
it, would be to call for education and consciousness raising
programs within government agencies. This is necessary and
will have to be an integral part of any initiative that
attempts to solve the riddle. But this, in itself, fails to
address substantive, procedural and structural flaws.
Other approaches to the problem would be impractical in
the short run, or pertinent to other social sciences, if they
required a complete restructuring of the government
administrative apparatus. It can be argued that the present
situation can not be changed without first transforming the
colonial condition of Puerto Rico. Also, it would be
appropriate to question the changes possible without a
transformation of the exploitative capitalist system. But I
have chosen to limit this work to what may be possible within
the existing political, and economic structures.
To make a serious and practical proposal that could have
a significant impact in bettering the process, the trick is in
carving a space between the radical transformation of society
and basically inconsequential (because of the present
structural arrangement) educational programs. There are three
major issues that, in my opinion, any such attempt must
address, these are: (1) the quality of the scientific analysis
conducted and of the documents produced; (2) public
participation and the effective dissemination of information;
and (3) to make the EIS the planning tool it was designed to
be.
To better the quality of the scientific analysis and the
documents produced through the EIS process, the major hurdle
is the control exercised by private development interests. But
government agencies presently do not have the resources needed
to prepare these documents. Given the Planning Board's
manipulation of the Bahia Ballena EIS process, the governor's
ability to bring the DNR in line with his program by naming a
new Secretary, the IDC's violent objections to Ley 9, and the
disregard for the law's intent manifest in the proposed
amendments, I do not see how this could be changed by simply
requiring the agencies to conduct the assessments themselves.
Anyhow, the number and variety of personnel and scientific
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disciplines necessary to enable all agencies to prepare these
documents most probably is well beyond what the government can
afford. Even if it was not beyond the state's financial
capacity, and the agencies were capable of conducting a fair
process, it might not be a wise investment.' Thus, a
combination of government-employed scientists and outside
consultants probably is the most practical alternative. Dr.
Ariel Lugo's suggestion that a fund be created with
contributions from the developers to finance government
preparation of EISs, I think is in the right track. (Lugo,
Documents, March 19, 1990)
To bring citizens into the process, information must be
made available as early as possible and consistently, be easy
to access, and easy to understand. An information-
dissemination mechanism must be developed so that all
interested parties receive on a regular basis up-to-date
information. This could be accomplished by a monthly
newsletter that provides information such as: (1) one
paragraph descriptions of projects under consideration; (2)
date and place of up-coming scoping meetings; (3) date and
place of other public meetings related to the EIS process; (4)
1 Some personnel, say a civil engineer, may always have work
no matter what agency s/he works in. Others, say a marine
biologist, may only be needed occasionally for the EISs prepared by
some agency and rarely by another. But in order to have them
available an agency would have to employ both. While the engineer
above will always be meaningfully employed the biologist will have
plenty of idle time.
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the availability of completed EISs; (5) date and place of
public hearings on the completed EISs; and (6) follow-up
information on the government's decisional process.
Citizens must be provided with a meaningful opportunity
to participate in the decision-making process, not just to
"participate in participation." (Arnstein, 1968, p. 219) To
accomplish this, citizen involvement must start as early as
possible in the EIS process, as early as the scoping meeting,
continue through the data gathering and EIS preparation
processes, and include monitoring for compliance with
mitigation measures. Early and meaningful citizen involvement
would go a long way in making the EIS process the planning
tool it was designed to be. One of the EIS's major flaws in
terms of not fulfilling its planning dimension is the "paper
tiger" quality of the alternative developments considered in
the EISs. This could be addressed by going beyond the law's
present, outmoded, citizen participation requirements and
making citizens an integral part of the process by having the
affected community identify the alternatives to be considered
in the EIS.
An Empowering Approach to Citizen Involvement
Citizen involvement is inevitable, the government must
accept this reality and act accordingly. Even if there are no
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legal requirements for public involvement the people will find
out about development projects one way or another. And, if
those values that hold the community together are threatened,
the people will organize and act on their concern. When the
government keeps the community out of the decision-making
process the organization that will emerge will come out
fighting. The stage will be set for a prolonged process, with
costs (in time and money) probably beyond what any of the
parties involved can afford.
Citizen involvement will inevitably prolong the process.
But, as was the case in the Bahia Ballena EIS process, their
participation does serve to identify issues otherwise
overlooked and is the only way to do "good planning. " The
government and the community have two alternative ways of
approaching public participation in the decision-making
process. The government can approach it as an exercise in
citizen empowerment, or, playing-down the community's ability
to contribute and/or obstruct, the government can continue to
attempt to manipulate citizens. The community can approach the
process in a consensus-building or confrontational mode.
Depending on which approach each chooses, the result can be
mutual alienation or collaboration. The following matrix
represents the possible outcomes of these different
approaches.
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CITIZENS ATTITUDE
consensus building confrontation
I I II
turns public support I mutual alienation
manipulation into mistrust |
GOVERNMENT
ATTITUDE IV | III
collaboration I
best guarantee to Iturns public mistrust
empowerment reach "best possible I into support
decision" I
Presently in Puerto Rico, public participation is an
exercise in mutual alienation (Quadrant II). The road from
there to collaboration (Quadrant IV) is a long one, but not
impossible to travel. The authoritarian nature of the state
and the history of public participation programs are such that
communities will not go from the confrontational mode to the
consensus building one unless the state demonstrates in
practice its willingness to share power. When a trusting
community faces a manipulative government, the next move is to
mutual alienation (Quadrant II).
Collaboration (Quadrant IV) is reached when the community
realizes through its own experience that the government is in
fact willing to involve citizens and to share its power
(Quadrant III). Even if the community starts out in a
confrontational mode, if the state involves the community in
a meaningful way by sharing its power, the transition to
collaboration (Quadrant IV) should be a relatively swift one.
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The state holds the power, but voluntarily or through an
expensive struggle that does not change the context in which
participation happens, as was the case in Bahia Ballena, it
will have to share it.
The process must be restructured in way that sends a
clear signal that the state is willing to share its power over
the process. To accomplish this, in my opinion, the most
important issue that needs to be addressed is the governor's
control over the process. I see two alternatives: (1) To take
the EQB from under the governor's direct control. (2) Create
an EIS Institute to take over the responsibilities of (i)
publishing the newsletter mentioned above; (ii) prepare the
EIS or contract with the scientific teams that will prepare
the documents; (iii) manage the public participation program.
I lean towards the second alternative for practical
reasons. The EQB's responsibilities go beyond the EIS process.
It is also a regulatory agency, responsible for licensing,
permitting, and monitoring air and water quality, hazardous
wastes, etc. The legislature and the governor would have ample
and valid reasons to oppose such a change without reorganizing
the EQB and re-distributing its regulatory responsibilities.
Which most certainly will prove to be a major headache, if
possible at all.
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The EIS Institute would not respond directly to the
governor. It would be ruled by a governing body composed of
bona fide representatives of (1) industrialists and
developers, (2) community and environmental organizations, and
(3) scientists and technical experts; with an equal number of
seats reserved for each group. Representatives from these
three groups would not be named by the governor but instead
would be elected by the population at large. Initially, the
EQB would have the responsibility of certifying candidates to
the board as bona fide members of the groups, and for the
election; eventually these responsibilities would be
transferred to the Institute's board of directors.
The Institute's budget would be generated by charging
developers for the service of preparing EIS documents and
contributions from government agencies to help finance the
public involvement program. As discussed above, hiring all the
scientists, planners, and technicians needed to prepare EISs
probably would not be a wise investment. The Institute would
have a small core group of experts, but otherwise would hire
consultants to conduct the impact analysis and prepare the
EISs.
The process would be as follows. Mr. Developer approaches
a government agency with a project that categorically requires
an EIS, or would require re-zoning, or government financing,
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or in some other way triggers the EIS process. Instead of that
agency asking Mr. Developer to hire a technical team to
prepare the document, as it is done today, the agency refers
Mr. Developer to the Institute. Upon presenting his plan to
the Institute's staff, Mr. Developer is given an estimate of
the cost and a payment schedule is prepared. Before a formal
scoping meeting is held, Institute staff organize a public
meeting to present the project proposal and begin the process
of identifying alternatives to be considered. Simultaneously,
the institute is actively involved in hiring consultants to
prepare the EIS, assembling a team composed of Institute
staff, or a combination of the two. With the EIS team and
development alternatives in place, a participatory fact
finding and analysis process, managed by the Institute's
staff, gets underway. Once the EIS has been prepared the
document is delivered to the proponent agency. From then on
the process would follow the same steps as it does today.
This changed process could increase the costs of
preparing the document, but this increase probably will be
marginal. Higher costs, would result from the requirements for
increased, pro-active citizen participation. Expecting the
results to be a more comprehensive assessment of impacts, a
better informed decision-making process, and development
policy that does not compromise environmental quality, the
increased cost will well be worth it. Some kind of affiliation
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with an organization like the University of Puerto Rico could
help counter the increase in costs. The University's planning,
engineering, and architecture schools, and the natural
sciences departments could provide team members at very
competitive costs. The University would benefit with the
increased revenue and the opportunity to take students into
the "real world."
In order to test this proposal's viability a pilot
program would be appropriate. The pilot project would handle
projects brought to it voluntarily by public or private
developers. Municipalities, for example, could very well be
very interested in such a pilot program. And there will be
some conscientious and environmentally aware private developer
that will take advantage of the program.
Another alternative for the Institute would be to
organize it as a non-government organization, a non-profit
research group or information clearing-house. Such a group
would have come from citizens' initiative and would face great
obstacles. If devoted to preparing EIS its ability to
transform the process would be piecemeal, impacting only those
cases that it may handle. The objective of broader
dissemination of information would not be addressed. If the
model adopted is that of an information clearing-house, given
the government's attitude, just getting all the necessary
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information will prove to be a major struggle.
As I stated in the introduction. My research is far from
being an exhaustive work and the recommendations are presented
with the intention of generating debate. I hope to have raised
some important issues and contributed to the on-going
discussion on the roles of environmental impact assessment and
public participation in planning and policy-making. Much more
research will be required before we can get a handle on the
issues raised here.
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(June 11, 1988, No. 24) Partido Socialista
Puertorriquelo, Gu~nica (position papers series) mimeo.
(August 11, 1990, No.32) Partido Socialista
Puertorriquelo, Gu~nica (position papers series) mimeo.
(February 23, 1991, No. 8) Partido Socialista
Puertorriqueno, Guhnica (position papers series) mimeo.
(January 7, 1989, No. 1) Partido Socialista
Puertorriquelo, Gu~nica (position papers series) mimeo.
Fundaci6n Puertorriquefla de Conservaci6n (August 17, 1990)
Memorandum to File Bahia Ballena.
(August 24, 1990) Memorandum to File Bahia
Ballena.
(November 9, 1989) Board of Directors
Meeting Minutes.
(December 15, 1989) Memorandum to File Bahia
Ballena.
and Comit6 Pro Rescate de Gu~nica (April 21,
1989) Acuerdo.
(June 10, 1989) Meeting Minutes.
(May 30, 1990) Meeting Minutes.
Misi6n Industrial (February 26, 1991) Press Release
(August 27, 1987) Letter to UNESCO.
(November 14, 1988) Letter to Ramsar List
organization.
(4 December 1988) Press Release.
(May 31, 1990) Press Release.
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(February 26, 1991) Press Release.
2. Personal Journals and Correspondance
Moore, J., Bahia Ballena property owner, (December 22, 1990)
Letter to J. Laborde, Secretary, Department of Natural
Resources.
(December 5, 1990) Letter to A.M. Vera,
Executive Director, Puerto Rican Conservation Foundation.
(November 8, 1990) Letter to A.M. Vera,
Executive Director, Puerto Rican Conservation Foundation.
Santana Ronda, P., (August 1988) Letter to Dr. N. Garcia,
Director, Servicios Cientificos y T6cnicos.
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B. Government Organizations
1. Letters and Memoranda (known authors)
Cardona, E.L., Assistant Secretary, Department of Nartural
Resources (June 20, 1986) Memorandum to Ruth Carreras,
Assistant Secretary, Department of Natural Resources; Asunto:
C-1176-607 JP (C-586-898-JP) Bahia Ballena, Guhnica.
L6pez Atienza, C., Director, Physical Planning Division,
Puerto Rico Planning Board (June 22, 1987) Letter to Santos
Rohena Betancourt, EQB President; Asunto: Suplemento DIA-F-
JCA-76-004-JP.
M~ndez, J., Secretary, Department of Natural Resources (May 5,
1987) Letter to Kenneth Niddrie, Ballena Development
Corporation, Asunto: Suplemento Declaracion de Impacto
Ambiental - Club Med, Bahia Ballena, GuAnica, DIA 487-005 P.
(June 19, 1987) Letter to Kenneth Niddrie, Ballena
Development Corporation; Asunto: Suplemento Declaracion de
Impacto Ambiental - Club Med, Bahia Ballena, GuAnica, DIA 487-
005P.
Rohena Betancourt, S., President, Environmental Quality Board
(June 11, 1987) Letter to Patria Custodio, Planning Board
President; Asunto: Suplemento DIA Final JCA 76-004 (JP).
(June 23, 1987) Letter to Patria Custodio,
Planning Board President; Asunto: Informacion Adicional
Suplemento DIA-Final JCA-76-004-JP
2. Other Documents (authors not known)
Office of the Governor, (Undated) Asunto a Discutirse en las
Enmiendas al Reglamento de Declaraciones de Impacto Ambiental.
Puerto Rico Department of Natural Resources (July 1985)
Recursos Naturales Orienta: GuAnica.
Puerto Rico Environmental Quality Board, (Undated A) Manual
para la preparaci6n evaluaci6n y uso de las declaraciones de
impacto ambiental.
(Undated B) Diagrama de
Organizaci6n.
(June 4, 1984) Regulation for
Environmental Impact Statements, Resolution R-83-42-8 (May 23,
1984).
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(1990) Enmiendas al Reglamento
sobre Declaraciones de Impacto Ambiental de Puerto Rico.
(April 4, 1990) Public Hearing
Written Testimony: Amendments to the EIS Regulations.
Government Agencies
(1) Diaz Soltero, H., Field Supervisor, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service. (2) Rivera, P.J., Director,
Environmental Affairs Office, Puerto Rico Industrial
Development Corporation. (3) Rivera, T., Director, Water
Quality, Puerto Rico Environmental Quality Board.
Citizens and Non-Government Organizations
(1) Cintr6n, J., and H. Rodriguez, Comit6 Yabucoeflo Pro
Calidad de Vida. (2) Col6n Morales, M., M.D., President,
Sociedad de Historia Natural de Puerto Rico. (3) Comisi6n
Vecinal de Punta Santiago. (4) Garcia, N., Ph.D.,
Director, Servicios Cientificos y Tecnicos. (5) Jimenez
Barber, C.M., President (1972-1976) Puerto Rico
Environmental Quality Board. (6) Lugo, A., Dr. (7)
Martinez Oquendo, J.A., Esquire, Sociedad Espeleol6gica
de Puerto Rico. (8) Morales Cordero, J.A., and M.
Sarriera RomAn, Students, University of Puerto Rico Law
School. (9) Reyes, N. (10) Vera, A.M., Executive
Director, Puerto Rican Conservation Foundation.
Puerto Rico Planning Board, (Undated) Listado de Documentos e
Informaci6n Necesarios Para la Radicaci6n de Consultas de
Ubicaci6n P'blicas.
(1976) Declaraci6n de Impacto
Ambiental JCA-76-004 (JP).
(June 6, 1979) Administrative Form:
JP-822, Formulario Ambiental para Proyectos Industriales.
(August 21, 1980) Administrative
Form: JP-826, Formulario Ambiental para Proyectos
Residenciales, Comerciales y/o Turisticos-Recreativos.
(1987) Suplemento al DIA JCA-76-
004(JP),, Consulta #86-59-1025 JPU, Bahia Ballena, GuAnica.
(May 18, 1987) Public Hearing
Testimony: Suplemento al DIA JCA-76-004 (JP), audio-recording,
four 90-minutes tapes.
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(July 9, 1987) Resoluci6n, Primera
Extension al Informe Num. 86-59-JPU-1293 Consulta Num. 86-59-
1025 JPU.
(1988) Procedimiento Operacional en
la Tramitaci6n de Consultas.
(1989) Administrative Form: JP-
826.1 Anejo Formulario Ambiental.
(May 31, 1990) Resolucion, Cuarta
Extension al Informe Numero 86-59-JPU-1293, Consulta Numero
86-59-1025-JPU.
3. Legislation, Court Decisions
Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.
2d 849, 851 (1973)
Ley OrqAnica de la Junta de Planificaci6n de Puerto Rico (Ley
no.75 del 24 de Junio de 1975, segun enmendada) -- booklet
published by Puerto Rico Planning Board, Septemeber 1978.
Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F. 2d 460, 467 (1973)
Pedro Santana Ronda y Salvador Mejill Lozada vs. Junta de
Planificaci6n del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, Civil
No. CS87-2713, Sentencia (July 7, 1989).
Requlation for Environmental Impact Assessment, R-83-42-8,
(May 23, 1984)
Puerto Rico Environmental Public Policy Act (Law No. 9 of June
18, 1970, as amended by Law no.72 of May 31, 1973; Law no.23
of April 29, 1974; Law no.25 of July 10, 1978; Law. no.38 of
October 5, 1983; Law no.49 of June 7, 1984; and Law no.31 of
June 13, 1985.)
Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F. 2d 43, 59, (1974).
Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F. 2d 957, 963 (5th Circuit 1983)
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IV. INTERVIEWS
Anonymous staff member, Environmental Quality Board (August
23, 1990) .
Canals Mora, M., Gu~nica State Forest Resident Biologist,
Department of Natural Resources (August 30, 1990).
Castillo, A.M., Executive Director, Asociaci6n de Alcaldes de
Puerto Rico (August 27, 1990).
Col6n Garcia, E., Esquire, Gu~nica resident (February 17,
1991).
Cuadrado, I.C., Director, EIS Division, Planning Board
(Interview #1: August 14, 1990; Interview #2 April 1991 --
telephone interview).
Delanooy, R., Planner, Environmental Quality Board (August 24,
1990).
Dueho, L., Associate Vice-President, Planning Board (August
28, 1990).
FernAndez, J., Organizer, Misi6n Industrial (Interview #1:
August 28, 1990; Interview #2: February 19, 1991)
Garcia, N., Ph.D., Director, Servicios Tecnicos y Cientificos
(February 1, 1991).
Gonzalez, G., Esq., Consultant Environmental Quality Board
(August 9, 1990).
GuzmAn, F., Director EIS Division, Environmental Quality Board
(Interview #1: August 24, 1990; Interview #2: April 15, 1991 -
- telephone interview).
Gimenez Barber, C.M., President, Environmental Quality Board,
1972-1976, (April 3, 1990 -- telephone interview) .
Meyn, M., Misi6n Industrial (August 14, 1990) .
Niddrie, K., Architec, Ballena Development Corporation (August
24, 1990).
Pab6n, N., EIS Technician, Environmental Quality Board (August
6, 1990).
P6rez, W., Comite Pro Rescate de Gu~nica (February 23, 1991).
Rivera, M., Staff Scientist, Misi6n Industrial (August 8,
1990).
122
Rodriguez, A.D., Associate Vice-President, Planning Board
(August 14, 1990).
Rodriguez, M., Mayor of Guhnica (August 17, 1990).
Saad6, P., Esquire (August 24, 1990).
Santana Ronda, P., Comit6 Pro Rescate de Gu&nica (Interview
#1: August 10, 1990; Interview #2: February 23, 1991).
Valdez Pizzinni, M., Ph.D., Profesor, University of Puerto
Rico, Mayagez (August 20, 1990).
Vargas, C., Public Records, Planning Board (August 23, 1990).
Vargas, P.J., Secretary, Gu~nica Municipal Assembly (Interview
#1 August 16, 1990; Interview #2 August 31, 1990).
Vera, A.M., Executive Director, Puerto Rican Conservation
Foundation (February 28, 1991).
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ACRONYMS
ARPE -- Administraci6n de Reglamentos y Permisos de Puerto
Rico (Puerto Rico Bureau of Permits and Regulations)
D-N (or DN) -- Statement of Significant Environmental Impact
EA -- Environmental Assessment
EIS -- Environmental Impact Statement
EQB -- Puerto Rico Environmental Quality Board
EQC -- United States Environmental Quality Council
DNR -- Puerto Rico Department of Natural Resources
IDC -- Puerto Rico Industrial Development Corporation
NEPA -- National Environmental Policy Act
PREPPA -- Puerto Rico Environmental Policy Act
U.S. FWS -- United States Fish and Wildlife Service
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